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An Expert Panel of the Royal Society of Canada 
and a Select Committee of the Québec National As-
sembly both recently recommended the issuance of 
permissive guidelines for the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion on voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide and “medical aid in dying” respectively. It 
seems timely, therefore, to propose a set of offence-
specific guidelines for how prosecutorial discretion 
should be exercised in cases of voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide in Canadian provinces and terri-
tories. We take as our starting point the only exist-
ing guidelines of this sort currently in force in the 
world (i.e. the British Columbia Guidelines, and the 
England and Wales Guidelines). In light of certain 
concerns we have with these guidelines, we outline 
an approach to constructing guidelines for Canadian 
jurisdictions that begins with identifying three guid-
ing principles we argue are appropriate for this pur-
pose (respect for autonomy, the need for high-
quality prosecutorial decision making, and the im-
portance of public confidence in that decision mak-
ing), and ends with a concrete and detailed set of 
proposed guidelines. The paper is consistent with, 
but  also extends,  the work of the  Royal Society of  
Un panel d’expert de la Société Royale du Canada 
et une Commission spéciale de l’Assemblée natio-
nale du Québec ont tous les deux récemment 
recommandé que soit émises des directives permet-
tant exercice d’un pouvoir de poursuite discrétion-
naire concernant l’euthanasie et le suicide assisté et 
« l’assistance médicale pour mourir », respective-
ment. Il semble donc à propos de proposer une série 
de directives spécifiques aux offenses sur la façon 
dont le pouvoir de poursuite discrétionnaire dans les 
territoires et provinces canadiennes serait appliqué 
dans les cas d’euthanasie et de suicide assisté. Nous 
avons pris comme point de départ les seules direc-
tives de la sorte existant déjà (c’est-à-dire celle de la 
Colombie-Britannique et de l’Angleterre et du Pays 
de Galles). Par contre, compte tenu de certaines de 
nos réserves concernant ces directives, nous avons 
ensuite établi les grandes lignes d’une approche 
permettant de mettre sur pied des directives pour les 
juridictions canadiennes, qui débute par  
l’identification de trois principes de base qui sont 
selon nous appropriées à cette fin (respect de 
l’autonomie, besoin pour une grande qualité de prise 
de prise de décision du poursuivant et la confiance 
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du public envers cette prise de décision) pour se 
terminer par une série de directives concrètes et dé-
taillées.  Le présent document est compatible avec le 
travail de la Société royale du Canada tout en en 
augmentant la portée.   
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Introduction 
In Canada, it is illegal to counsel, aid, or abet a person to commit sui-
cide.1 Voluntary euthanasia is also illegal, as it contravenes the Criminal 
Code prohibition on murder.2 While clear, the legal status of these forms of 
assisted death has been the subject of seemingly intractable debate for a 
number of years. However, during the past year, there have been three major 
developments in the arena of assisted death law and policy. First, the Royal 
Society of Canada appointed an Expert Panel on End-of-Life Decision Mak-
ing tasked with contribution to the public policy debate on end of life law 
and policy in Canada (“RSC Panel”).3 Second, the Québec National Assem-
bly appointed a Select Committee on the Right to Die with Dignity to study 
the issues (“Québec Committee”).4 Third, a constitutional challenge of the 
Criminal Code prohibitions on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide was 
launched in British Columbia.5 Within a seven-month period, the RSC Panel, 
the Québec Committee, and the BC Supreme Court released their respective 
reports and decision. All three, each in their own way, concluded that the 
current laws on assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia must change. In 
this paper, we explore one of the recommended avenues of reform arising 
from the RSC Panel and the Québec Committee: guidelines for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion.6 
The RSC Panel report included the following recommendation:  
The Panel recommends that, unless or until the Criminal Code is 
reformed as recommended above [“that the prohibitions on as-
sisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia in the Criminal Code be 
                                                   
1 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241(b). 
2 Ibid, s 229(a)(i). 
3 The Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel, End-of-Life Decision Making (Ottawa: 
RSC, 2011), online: <http://rsc-src.ca/sites/default/files/pdf/RSCEndofLife Report 
2011_EN_Formatted_FINAL.pdf > [RSC Panel Report]. 
4 National Assembly of Québec Select Committee, Dying With Dignity (Québec City: 
National Assembly of Québec, 2010) at 37, online: <www.assnat.qc.ca/en/ 
actualites-salle-presse/nouvelle/Actualite-25939.html> [Québec Committee 
Report]. 
5 Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 886 (available on CanLII) [Carter]. 
6 Both the RSC Panel and the Québec Committee made recommendations beyond 
prosecutorial guidelines (e.g. changes to the Criminal Code and changes to 
provincial legislation respectively). However, these are not the subject of this 
paper. 
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modified such that, in carefully circumscribed and monitored 
circumstances, they are legally permissible” (at 96)], those with 
authority over prosecutorial policies in all provinces and territo-
ries introduce such policies to provide guidance with respect to 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to make clear the cir-
cumstances within which a prosecution for assisted suicide or 
voluntary euthanasia would not be in order.7  
The Québec Committee report included the following recommendation:  
The Committee recommends that the Attorney General of Qué-
bec issue directives (in the form of “guidelines and measures”) 
to the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions to ensure that 
a physician who provides medical aid in dying in accordance 
with the criteria provided by law cannot be prosecuted.8  
In light of these recommendations, a challenge has clearly been set: to devel-
op offence-specific guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 
cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.9  
In this paper we seek to meet this challenge. We propose specific guide-
lines to supplement the existing general guidelines. First, we outline the way 
in which charging guidelines operate in Canadian provinces in relation to the 
prosecution of offences generally. Second, we consider the offence-specific 
guidelines promulgated in British Columbia (“Crown Counsel Policy Manu-
al: Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide”)10, and England and Wales (“Policy for 
Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide”)11. We 
                                                   
7 RSC Panel Report, supra note 4.  
8 Québec, Select Committee on Dying with Dignity, Report (Québec City: National 
Assembly of Québec, 2012) at 90, online: <www.assnat.qc.ca/en/actualites-salle-
presse/nouvelle/Actualite-25939.html> [Québec Committee Recommendations]. 
9 Both the RSC Panel and the Québec Committee called for prosecutorial charging 
guidelines and indicated some content for them by way of "criteria" (Québec) or 
"core elements" (RSC Panel) for a permissive regime. However, neither one 
developed actual guidelines. 
10 Office of the Attorney General, by the Criminal Justice Branch (Victoria: AG, 
2004), online: <www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/EUT1-
EuthanasiaAndAssistedSuicide-15Mar2004.pdf> [BC Guidelines]. 
11 England and Wales, Director of Public Prosecutions, “Policy for Prosecutors in 
Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide” by the Crown Prosecution 
Service (London: DPP, 2010), online: <www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution 
/assisted_suicide_policy.pdf> [England and Wales Guidelines]. These guidelines 
2012 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN ASSISTED DYING IN 
CANADA: A PROPOSAL FOR CHARGING GUIDELINES 
117 
 
 
look first at the BC Guidelines, as they are the only existing assisted death 
offence-specific guidelines from a Canadian jurisdiction. We then focus on 
the England and Wales Guidelines, the only existing detailed assisted suicide 
prosecutorial charging guidelines in the world.12  
However, while these two sets of guidelines provide a useful starting 
point, we argue that they are deficient in a number of respects. We therefore 
advance an approach to constructing alternative guidelines that begins by 
identifying three guiding principles that we argue are appropriate for this 
purpose: respect for autonomy; the need for high-quality prosecutorial deci-
sion making; and the importance of public confidence in that decision mak-
ing. Using those principles, we then construct our own detailed guidelines for 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in those cases of voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide that the RSC Panel concluded should be permitted in 
Canada.  
For ease of reference, as each element is discussed in detail, the relevant 
portion of our proposed guidelines is set out in a text box. The proposed 
guidelines are set out in full in Appendix I.13 Before proceeding, we must 
      
do not apply in Scotland. See James Chalmers, “Assisted Suicide: Jurisdiction and 
Discretion” (2010) 14:2 Ed L Rev 295; Sheila AM McLean, Clare Connelly & J 
Kenyon Mason, “Purdy in Scotland: We Hear, But Should We Listen?” (2009) 4 
Jurid Rev 265 at 265. 
12 In drafting our proposed guidelines, we were influenced by the experience of the 
Netherlands with charging guidelines between 1994 and 2002. However, the 
Dutch guidelines grew out of the defence of necessity, which has not been 
accepted by Canadian courts as the foundation for a permissive regime with 
respect to voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. See e.g. R v Latimer, 2001 
SCC 1, [2001] 1 SCR 3, 193 DLR (4th) 577. Furthermore, the Dutch guidelines 
were superseded by the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (entered into force April 2002), online: 
<www.nvve.nl/assets/nvve/english/EuthanasiaLaw.pdf>. Therefore, we will not 
review them here. 
13 For those who are persuaded by the limits on access to assisted suicide or voluntary 
euthanasia recommended by Madam Justice Smith in Carter or the Québec 
Committee, we offer elements that could be added to our proposed guidelines to 
make them consistent with Madam Justice Smith’s limits (Appendix II) or the 
Québec Committee’s limits (Appendix III). It must be emphasized that Madam 
Justice Smith’s decision does not contemplate prosecutorial charging guidelines 
but rather compels changes to the Criminal Code. It is not anticipated that the draft 
guidelines provided in Appendix II would be implemented, should the government 
fail in its attempts to have her decision overturned at the BC Court of Appeal and 
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address three preliminary issues. First, we offer the following definitions of 
our key terms (taken from the RSC Panel Report): 
“Assisted suicide” is the act of intentionally killing oneself with 
the assistance of another. An example is a woman with ad-
vanced ALS [amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, also known as Lou 
Gehrig’s Disease] who gets a prescription from her physician for 
barbiturates and uses the drugs to kill herself. 
“Voluntary euthanasia” is an act undertaken by one person to 
kill another person whose life is no longer worth living to them 
in accordance with the wishes of that person. An example is a 
man bedridden with many of the consequences of a massive 
stroke whose physician, at his request, gives him a lethal injec-
tion of barbiturates and muscle relaxants.14 
      
the Supreme Court of Canada. In such a case, the Criminal Code would be revised 
to reflect the framework set out in her decision. Similarly, the Québec Committee 
did not recommend prosecutorial charging guidelines alone but, rather, in addition 
to changes to provincial legislation. It is not anticipated that the draft guidelines 
provided in Appendix III would be implemented as is, should the Québec National 
Assembly pass legislation with respect to medical aid in dying. If it did, there 
would be provincial legislation to set out a statutory framework within which 
prosecutors would be required to act. The charging guidelines would be drafted 
against that statutory backdrop. Rather, these additional draft guidelines are 
offered to show what our proposed prosecutorial charging guidelines would look 
like if the concerns regarding protection of the vulnerable, expressed in Madam 
Justice Smith’s decision and in the Québec Committee Report, but rejected by the 
RSC Panel, were reflected in them, through additional factors tending to favour 
prosecution. If the government is successful on appeal against Madam Smith’s 
decision, then a provincial or territorial Attorney General wishing to provide 
guidance re: prosecutions of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia and 
persuaded by her proposed limits on access, could use the draft guidelines 
presented in Appendix II. If there is no legislation passed in Québec but the 
Attorney General nonetheless wishes to follow the recommendations of the 
Québec Committee with respect to charging guidelines, then he or she could use 
the draft guidelines presented in Appendix III. 
14 These definitions were taken from the definitions provided in the RSC Panel Re-
port, supra note 4 at 7. In turn, the Panel’s definitions were drawn (and sometimes 
modified) from Jocelyn Downie, Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004) at 6-7; Canada, Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide, Of Life and Death: Final Report (Ottawa: Special Senate 
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Second, we explain our use of the Royal Society of Canada Panel Report 
(rather than the Québec Committee Report or the Carter decision) as the 
foundation for our guidelines. Like the RSC Panel and unlike the Québec 
Committee, we do not seek to limit access to voluntary euthanasia or assisted 
suicide to those who are “suffering from a serious, incurable disease”, “in an 
advanced state of weakening capacities, with no chance of improvement”, or 
having “constant and unbearable physical or psychological suffering that 
cannot be eased under conditions he or she deems tolerable.”15 We were per-
suaded by the arguments on limits to access presented in the RSC Panel Re-
port and the literature grounding it, and so in this paper we are attempting to 
demonstrate the implications of that report for practice by rolling it out into 
concrete guidelines. 
Third, we anticipate a possible argument that our proposed guidelines 
could be subject to an administrative law challenge. Section 14 of the Crimi-
nal Code states: “No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on 
him, and such consent does not affect the criminal responsibility of any per-
son by whom death may be inflicted on the person by whom consent is giv-
en.”16 The administrative law challenge could be made because our guide-
lines are based on an autonomous choice by the deceased for his or her life to 
end – this is inconsistent with the prohibition on consenting to one’s own 
death. We consider, however, that our proposed guidelines would withstand 
such a challenge because they do not infringe on the criteria delineating 
when criminal responsibility is established as a matter of law. Instead, the 
proposed voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide guidelines are relevant 
only to the exercise of discretion in determining whether it is in the public in-
terest for that conduct to be prosecuted. We also note that the public interest 
factor of autonomous choice in the proposed guidelines would not be the sole 
criterion for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, since prosecutors would 
also have to apply the other public interest considerations, as set out in the 
general prosecution guidelines. 
I. Prosecutorial Guidelines in Canada 
The criminal offences that principally arise in the context of voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are murder; manslaughter; administering a 
      
Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, June 1995), online: 
<www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/351/euth/rep/lad-e.htm>. 
15 Québec Committee Recommendations, supra note 9 at 5. 
16 Supra note 2. 
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noxious thing; and aiding, abetting, or counselling suicide.17 It is no defence 
that an accused’s conduct was motivated by compassion,18 nor is a person 
excused from criminal responsibility because a victim consented to his or her 
own death.19 However, the commission of one of the above offences is not in 
and of itself sufficient to lead to prosecution. Prosecutors have discretion 
with respect to the prosecution and withdrawal of charges under the Criminal 
Code. Individual prosecutors are assisted in the exercise of this discretion 
through their upward reporting relationships and by instructions, guidelines, 
or directives (hereafter “guidelines”) issued under the authority of the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) or the Attorney General.20 These guide-
                                                   
17 Ibid ss 229, 234, 245, 241. 
18 Motive is not relevant to determining criminal responsibility in these cases. Justice 
Dickson, as he then was, stated the general rule with respect to motive and the 
criminal law in R v Lewis, [1979] 2 SCR 821 at 831, 98 DLR (3d) 111: “In 
ordinary parlance, the words ‘intent’ and ‘motive’ are frequently used 
interchangeably, but in the criminal law they are distinct. In most criminal trials, 
the mental element, the mens rea with which the Court is concerned, relates to 
‘intent,’ i.e., the exercise of a free will to use particular means to produce a 
particular result, rather than with “motive,” i.e., that which precedes and induces 
the exercise of the will. The mental element of a crime ordinarily involves no 
reference to motive.” That said, motive may be relevant to sentencing an 
individual. It should also be noted here that, as somewhat of an exception to the 
general approach taken to motive in respect of criminal responsibility, the motives 
of health care professionals have been taken into account in certain instances. See 
Joan Gilmour, “Death, Dying and Decision-Making about End of Life Care” in 
Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law 
and Policy, 4th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011) at 431. However, these ‘instances’ 
are explicitly distinguished from euthanasia and assisted suicide by those who 
embrace the exception (rather, they relate to pain management and withholding or 
withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment). 
19 Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 14. 
20 In some jurisdictions, there is both a statutorily independent Director of Public 
Prosecution and an Attorney General (i.e., Nova Scotia, Québec, and at the federal 
level) while in others, there is no DPP or the DPP is not independent of the 
Attorney General. For examples of charging guidelines in various jurisdictions, 
see British Columbia, Prosecution Services, “Crown Counsel Policy Manual” 
(British Columbia: PS, 18 November 2005), online: <www.ag.gov.bc.ca/ 
prosecution-service/policy-man/index.htm> [BC General Guidelines]; Nova 
Scotia, Public Prosecution Service, “Crown Attorney Manual” (Halifax: PPS, 
2004), online: <www.gov.ns.ca/pps/ca_manual.htm> [NS Guidelines]; 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
“Guidebook of Policies and Procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions 
in Newfoundland and Labrador”, (St. John’s: ODPP, October 2007), online: 
2012 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN ASSISTED DYING IN 
CANADA: A PROPOSAL FOR CHARGING GUIDELINES 
121 
 
 
lines set out the test that the Crown will apply in considering whether to 
prosecute the accused. Generally, there are two considerations: 
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence such that there is a reasona-
ble prospect of securing a conviction 
2. If so, whether it is in the public interest that a prosecution occur 
Of significance for this article is the second consideration. The various Ca-
nadian prosecution guidelines identify a range of factors that may be relevant 
to determining whether a prosecution is in the public interest: the seriousness 
of the alleged offence; any mitigating or aggravating circumstances; the 
characteristics of the accused, the victim and any witnesses (such as age, 
physical or mental health, or disability); the degree of the accused’s culpabil-
ity in relation to the offence; antecedents and background of the accused; the 
prevalence of this type of offence and the need for deterrence; the level of 
public concern about the offence; the attitude of the victim with regards to 
prosecution; the level of co-operation from the accused; the need to maintain 
confidence in Parliament, the courts, and the law; public order and morale; 
the likely sentence if the accused is convicted; and the likely length and cost 
of trial.21  
Although some of these factors may have particular applicability to cases 
involving voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, only the Province of 
British Columbia has developed guidelines that explicitly address such cases. 
However, the bulk (>90% of the text) of the BC Guidelines is directed at 
providing guidance under the heading of “substantial likelihood of convic-
tion”22 with respect to the characterization of “the conduct of the person in-
volved in a death”23; in particular, the Guidelines clearly delineate the fol-
lowing categories of conduct: euthanasia, assisted suicide, palliative care, 
      
<www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/prosecutions/pp_guide_book.pdf> [NL Guidelines]; 
Alberta, Justice and Solicitor General, “Crown Prosecutors’ Policy Manual” (Ed-
monton: JSG, 15 January 2009), online: <justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/ 
criminal_pros/Publications%20Library%20%20Criminal%20Prosecutions/Crown
Prosecutors%27PolicyManual.aspx/DispForm.aspx?ID=3> [AB Guidelines]; 
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, “Crown Policy Manual” (Toronto: 
MAG, 2005), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus. gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/ 
default.asp> [ON Guidelines].  
21 Ibid. 
22 BC Guidelines, supra note 11 at 1. 
23 Ibid. 
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and withholding or withdrawing treatment. The characterization of the con-
duct is critical because the guidelines clearly state that euthanasia and assist-
ed suicide are offences under the Criminal Code, while each of palliative 
care and the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, “when provided or ad-
ministered according to accepted ethical medical standards,” are “not subject 
to criminal prosecution.”24 Euthanasia and assisted suicide are clearly, under 
these guidelines, subject to criminal prosecution in BC. In the remaining 
<10% of the text of the guidelines, under the heading “Public interest”25, 
three factors are set out to provide guidance with respect to when the public 
interest requires prosecution: “1) the importance of supporting proper profes-
sional and ethical standards within the health care professions; 2) society’s 
interest in the protection of vulnerable persons; and 3) society’s interest in 
protecting the sanctity of human life, recognizing this does not require life to 
be preserved at all costs.”26 Of note is the fact that these three factors are ex-
pressed in terms that are usually relied upon by those arguing against permit-
ting voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. This suggests that, to the ex-
tent these public interest factors are relevant to a particular case, their appli-
cation would tend in favour of prosecution. In sum, the BC Guidelines clari-
fy what is already permitted and what is not, rather than expanding what is 
permitted. 
In light of this, the BC Guidelines should not be taken as sufficient to 
meet the recommendations made by the Québec Committee or the RSC Pan-
el. They do not carve out at least some cases of medical aid in dying or vol-
untary euthanasia and assisted suicide as not being appropriately subject to 
prosecution. The BC guidelines do not establish circumstances within which 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide would not be prosecuted, but rather 
distinguish conduct that would not be prosecuted (palliative care and with-
holding or withdrawal of treatment) from conduct that would (all cases of eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide, and those cases of palliative care and withhold-
ing or withdrawal that were not provided or administered according to ac-
cepted ethical medical standards).  
                                                   
24 Ibid at 2. 
25 Ibid at 4. 
26 Ibid.  
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II.   Prosecutorial Guidelines in England and Wales 
England and Wales recently produced prosecutorial guidelines dealing 
with assisted suicide (the guidelines do not cover voluntary euthanasia).27 
This occurred after the final judicial decision of the House of Lords in July 
2009: R. (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions.28 
Ms. Purdy suffered from primary progressive multiple sclerosis and wished 
to obtain assistance from her husband to travel to a jurisdiction where assist-
ed suicide was lawful so that she might die. She was, however, concerned 
that her husband might be prosecuted and so she requested information from 
the DPP as to the factors he would consider when deciding whether to con-
sent to the initiation of a prosecution for assisted suicide. This consent is 
specifically required by section 2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961 (UK). The DPP 
declined to provide that information, and Ms. Purdy challenged that decision. 
The House of Lords concluded that Ms. Purdy was entitled to know what 
factors the DPP would consider when deciding whether or not to prosecute, 
and directed him to promulgate an offence-specific policy to this effect.  
In reaching this conclusion, the House of Lords considered that Ms. 
Purdy’s right to respect for her private life under article 8(1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms29 was engaged. A failure to provide an offence-specific policy setting 
out the factors that will be used to determine whether a prosecution is in the 
public interest interfered with that right in a manner that was not “in accord-
ance with law” as required by article 8(2). Of significance for the House of 
                                                   
27 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12. 
28 R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions, [2009] UKHL 
45, [2010] 1 AC 345 [Purdy]. The case of R (on the application of Pretty) v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 AC 800 [Pretty] also 
dealt with the issue of prosecutorial discretion in the context of assisted suicide. 
We do not discuss this case here, as it is Purdy that ultimately triggered the 
England and Wales Guidelines, and it is these Guidelines that we considered, drew 
upon, and distinguished from ours. 
29 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 
September 1953), as amended by Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control 
System of the Convention, art 8(1), opened for signature 13 May 2004, CETS No 
194 (entered into force 1 June 2010). 
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Lords was that the general “Code for Crown Prosecutors”30 provided inade-
quate guidance as to when cases of this type would be prosecuted. The court 
also noted the disparity between the prohibition on assisted suicide and the 
general practice in terms of prosecutions actually brought. These factors 
meant that Ms. Purdy, and those who might assist her, such as her husband, 
were not able to make decisions about how to conduct themselves in accord-
ance with the criminal law. Further offence-specific guidance was therefore 
needed from the DPP. 
In September 2009, the DPP produced an interim policy setting out pro-
posed factors for and against the prosecution of cases of assisted suicide.31 
That policy was then the subject of a wide public consultation process which 
included the participation of over 4,700 individuals and organisations.32 In 
February 2010, after considering the results of that consultation exercise, the 
DPP published its final Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of En-
couraging or Assisting Suicide.33 In determining whether a prosecution is in 
the public interest, the guidelines set out 16 factors that favour prosecution 
and six factors that tend against it.  
The public interest factors tending in favour of prosecution are:34 
1. the victim was under 18 years of age;  
                                                   
30 England and Wales, Crown Prosecution Service, “The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors” (London: CPS, February 2010), online: <www.cps.gov.uk/ 
publications/docs/code2010english.pdf>. 
31 See England and Wales, Director of Public Prosecutions, “Interim Policy for 
Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Assisted Suicide”, by the Crown Prosecutions 
Service (London: DPP, September 2009), online: <www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/ 
as_policy.pdf> [England and Wales Interim Policy Consultation]. 
32 See England and Wales, Director of Public Prosecutions, Public Consultation 
Exercise on the Interim Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Assisted 
Suicide: Summary of Responses, by the Crown Prosecution Service (London: 
DPP, February 2010), online: <www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses.pdf> 
[England and Wales Interim Policy Summary]. See also England and Wales 
Interim Policy Consultation, supra note 32. 
33 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12. Note also that the Isle of Man has 
recently followed suit and issued guidelines in similar terms, see “Suicide policy 
same as UK”, Isle of Man News (28 September 2011), online: Isle of Man Today 
<www.iomtoday.co.im/news/isle-of-man-news/suicide_policy_same_as_uk_1_38 
14031>. 
34 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12 at para 43.  
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2. the victim did not have the capacity (as defined by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005) to reach an informed decision to commit sui-
cide;  
3. the victim had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and in-
formed decision to commit suicide;  
4. the victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his 
or her decision to commit suicide to the suspect;  
5. the victim did not seek the encouragement or assistance of the 
suspect personally or on his or her own initiative;  
6. the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; for exam-
ple, the suspect was motivated by the prospect that he or she or a 
person closely connected to him or her stood to gain in some 
way from the death of the victim;35  
7. the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide;  
8. the suspect did not take reasonable steps to ensure that any other 
person had not pressured the victim to commit suicide;  
9. the suspect had a history of violence or abuse against the victim;  
10. the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constitut-
ed the assistance him or herself;  
11. the suspect was unknown to the victim and encouraged or assist-
ed the victim to commit or attempt to commit suicide by provid-
ing specific information via, for example, a website or publica-
tion;  
12. the suspect gave encouragement or assistance to more than one 
victim who were not known to each other;  
                                                   
35 The guidelines later clarify that a common sense approach should be taken in 
relation to this factor. Some benefit may accrue to the suspect from the victim’s 
death but the critical element is the suspect’s motive: England and Wales 
Guidelines, ibid at para 44.  
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13. the suspect was paid by the victim or those close to the victim for 
his or her encouragement or assistance;  
14. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, 
nurse, other healthcare professional, a professional carer [wheth-
er for payment or not], or as a person in authority, such as a pris-
on officer, and the victim was in his or her care;  
15. the suspect was aware that the victim intended to commit suicide 
in a public place where it was reasonable to think that members 
of the public may be present;  
16. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a person involved 
in the management or as an employee (whether for payment or 
not) of an organisation or group, a purpose of which is to provide 
a physical environment (whether for payment or not) in which to 
allow another to commit suicide. 
The public interest factors tending against prosecution are:36  
1. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed 
decision to commit suicide;  
2. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion;  
3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the 
definition of the offence, were of only minor encouragement or 
assistance;  
4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking the 
course of action which resulted in his or her suicide;  
5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant en-
couragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on 
the part of the victim to commit suicide;  
6. the suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and fully 
assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances of the sui-
cide or the attempt and his or her part in providing encourage-
ment or assistance. 
                                                   
36 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12 at para 45.  
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There is a growing body of academic work that examines the England 
and Wales Guidelines.37 There is not space in this paper to rehearse that liter-
ature, nor is it our goal to undertake a detailed critique of the guidelines 
themselves. To contextualise our recommendations, however, we do make 
four brief observations that inform our alternative approach, and lead to 
points of disagreement and thereafter divergence between our guidelines and 
those in England and Wales. 
The first observation is that the guidelines do not appear to be founded 
on a set of coherent guiding principles. This seemed to be confirmed by evi-
dence given by the DPP responsible for developing the guidelines, Keir 
Starmer, to the privately established Commission on Assisted Dying.38 In re-
sponse to a question about what the “underlying principle” was for the guide-
lines, he noted that a “schematic approach” had been avoided on the basis 
                                                   
37 See for example, Penney Lewis, “Informal Legal Change on Assisted Suicide: The 
Policy for Prosecutors” (2011) 31 LS 119; JJ Shaw, “Fifty Years On: Against 
Stigmatising Myths, Taboos and Traditions Embedded Within the Suicide Act 
1961 (UK)” (2011) 18 J Law Med 798; Glenys Williams, “Assisting Suicide, the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors and the DPP’s Discretion” (2010) 39:2 C L World 
Rev 181; John Finnis, “Invoking the Principle of Legality Against the Rule of 
Law” (2010) Part IV NZL Rev 601; Carol C Cleary, “From ‘Personal Autonomy’ 
to ‘Death-on-Demand’: Will Purdy v DPP Legalize Assisted Suicide in the United 
Kingdom?” (2010) 33 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 289; Rob Heywood, “The DPP’s 
Prosecutorial Policy on Assisted Suicide” (2010) 21 King’s Law Journal 425; 
John Coggon, “Prosecutorial Policy on Encouraging and Assisting Suicide – How 
Much Clearer Could It Be?” (2010) 36 J Med Ethics 381; Jonathan Rogers, 
“Prosecutorial Policies, Prosecutorial Systems, and the Purdy Litigation” (2010) 
Issue 7 Crim L Rev 543; Roger Daw & Alex Solomon, “Assisted Suicide and 
Identifying the Public Interest in the Decision to Prosecute” (2010) Issue 10 Crim 
L Rev 737; Alexandra Mullock, “Overlooking the Criminally Compassionate: 
What Are the Implications of Prosecutorial Policy on Encouraging or Assisting 
Suicide” (2010) 18 Med L Rev 442; Suzanne Ost, “The De-Medicalisation of 
Assisted Dying: Is a Less Medicalised Model the Way Forward?” (2010) 18 Med 
L Rev 497; Clive Seale, “Do It Properly or Not at All” (2010) 340 BMJ 775; John 
Coggon, “Doctors and Assisted Suicide” (2010) 340 BMJ 547. Although not in 
the academic context, see also the detailed examination of the England and Wales 
Guidelines in The Commission on Assisted Dying, “The Current Legal Status Of 
Assisted Dying Is Inadequate and Incoherent...”, online: Demos see especially pp 
89-105 <www.demos.co.uk/files/476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_ 
single- NEW_.pdf?1328113363>.  
38 More information about the Commission on Assisted Dying is available online: 
<www.commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/about-the-commission-for-assisted-
dying>.  
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that such an approach would risk, “unless it’s very carefully constructed, un-
dermining Parliament’s intention that this should be an offence.”39 The role 
of the DPP was instead, he explained, to exercise discretion on a case-by-
case basis. The risk of this approach, however, is that the guidelines may not 
be conceptually sound and may lead to undesirable outcomes in practice. 
Consider, for example, the factor in favour of prosecution that the suspect 
was aware that the deceased intended to commit suicide in a public place 
where people may be present. It is clear that this factor is different in charac-
ter to the others in the guidelines and seems to be aimed at different consid-
erations. We ultimately omitted this factor from our guidelines because it did 
not flow from the guiding principles we established as relevant for our ap-
proach. We were also concerned that it may inadvertently capture places 
where we would argue it could be appropriate for voluntary euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide to occur, such as a hospital room which, at least sometimes, is 
a “public place.”40 Nevertheless, depending on the starting point of the anal-
ysis, such a factor could be regarded as appropriate. However, without a 
clear articulation of relevant guiding principles, it is unclear whether this is 
so, and what purpose this factor is serving.41  
The second observation is linked to the first: the authors of the guidelines 
failed to articulate the significance of, and the relationship between, the vari-
ous factors in the guidelines.42 For example, as we outline below when con-
                                                   
39 Commission on Assisted Dying, Transcript of Evidence from Keir Starmer QC, 
Director of Public Prosecutions (14 December 2010) at 17, online: Commission 
on Assisted Dying <commissiononassisteddying.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/12/Keir-Starmer-Transcript-Final1.pdf> [Keir Starmer Transcript]. 
40 We also note that there are public order offences that are capable of addressing this 
concern in a more nuanced fashion. 
41 It could reflect an attempt to prevent harm to third parties who witness the assisted 
suicide or voluntary euthanasia. The language is both so under-inclusive and over-
inclusive that it would not achieve this objective. It could capture individuals in a 
public place, such as a hospital room, where no innocent third parties will be 
harmed, and it could also fail to capture individuals in a private place, where third 
parties will be harmed by discovering the body. Location seems to be a poor proxy 
for some consequences one might legitimately seek to prevent. 
42 A similar critique is made in relation to the various elements of the “public interest” 
test of the “Code for Crown Prosecutors” (supra, note 31) in Jonathan Rogers, 
“Restructuring the Exercise Of Prosecutorial Discretion in England” (2006) 26 
Oxford J Legal Stud 775 at 793-94. The interim policy did suggest some factors 
be given greater weighting than others but this was ultimately removed, to make 
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structing our approach, some factors are considerations in their own right. An 
illustration from the England and Wales Guidelines is that “the victim had 
not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit sui-
cide.”43 By contrast, other factors might best be described as “evidential,” 
that is, they are evidence as to whether or not other factors in the guidelines 
will be substantiated. A relevant England and Wales example is whether or 
not “the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide,”44 as this in turn be-
comes evidence that is directly related to another factor: the voluntary nature 
of the decision. This distinction matters, since consistent and considered de-
cision making requires an understanding of the role and significance of the 
relevant factors in a process of deliberation. We acknowledge that the guide-
lines note that assessing the public interest is not a numerical exercise and 
that prosecutors “must decide the importance of each public interest factor in 
the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall assessment.”45 
However, we consider this sort of guidance to still fall short of articulating, 
in a meaningful way, how the factors are to be used in a decision making 
process. 
The third observation is that the England and Wales Guidelines apply on-
ly to assisted suicide and do not deal with voluntary euthanasia. Although 
this is the case because the guidelines were produced in response to the 
Purdy decision (which focused exclusively on assisted suicide), we consider 
that differentiating between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide is not 
justifiable for four reasons.46 Firstly, to differentiate discriminates on the ba-
      
the policy “clearer and more accessible” (England and Wales Interim Policy 
Summary, supra note 33 at 18, 20, 32, 34). 
43 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12 at para 43. 
44 Ibid at para 43. 
45 Ibid at para 39. 
46 While we can only provide a very brief justification for our position here, we note 
that the RSC Panel (supra note 4 at 100) and Smith J in Carter (supra note 6 at 
para 1393) included both voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in their 
permissive regimes. The Québec Committee Report seems to draw a distinction 
and include only euthanasia within “medical aid in dying”: “assisted suicide, 
considered an individual act in time and space, does not reflect the values of 
medical support and safety that are inseparable from the medical aid in dying 
option, as we propose it. Moreover, assisted suicide certainly cannot be considered 
a form of care and therefore runs counter to one of the main principles that guided 
our thinking and our recommendations, namely that any openness in this regard 
should be situated in the context of a continuum of care.” (supra note 5 at 79) To 
this statement we would simply respond that it is not the suicide that needs to fit 
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sis of disability. If the guidelines do not include voluntary euthanasia, a per-
son whose disability or illness means that he or she is not capable of ending 
life on his or her own (and so requires another to do the final act that ends his 
or her life), may be deprived of that assistance because of concerns about 
prosecution.47 Second, given that we argue for guidelines grounded in respect 
for autonomy, both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia are justified 
(even though the final agent of death is different). Third, a false assumption 
that sometimes underpins treating assisted suicide differently from voluntary 
euthanasia is that the former is always less serious than the latter. Including 
both in the guidelines allows prosecutors to assess whether a prosecution is 
appropriate in the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, as noted below, 
this assessment would occur not only having regard to the offence-specific 
guidelines, but also the general prosecutorial charging guidelines which take 
into account factors such as the level of culpability of the accused. Finally, 
we accept that some people may say that they would experience an emotion-
al difference between assisting another person to commit suicide and partici-
pating in voluntary euthanasia.48 However, different emotional reactions do 
not provide a foundation for a claim of there being a morally significant dis-
tinction – particularly a distinction to be used as the basis for public policy. 
Otherwise, of course, the fact that some people experience withholding 
treatment and withdrawing treatment differently could justify permitting one 
and not the other. In the context of public policy grounded in respect for au-
tonomy, in most circumstances, the emotional difference could justify a per-
son, such as a medical or other health professional, not being forced to pro-
vide both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia (autonomy is often con-
strained where its exercise would result in harm to others). It could not, how-
ever, justify a difference in public policy with respect to the permissibility of 
one and not the other.49 
The final observation is concerned with the emphasis the England and 
Wales Guidelines place on the conduct of the suspect being characterized as 
      
within the “continuum of care” but rather the provision of assistance and the 
provision of a prescription for a lethal medication, arguably, fits as well within the 
continuum of care as does provision of a lethal injection. 
47 Margaret Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) at 194-95.  
48 Ilinka Haverkate et al, “The Emotional Impact on Physicians of Hastening the 
Death of a Patient” (2001) 175 Med J Aust 519. 
49 Otlowski, supra note 48. See also, for example, Dan Brock, “Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia” (1992) 22:2 The Hastings Center Report 10. 
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non-professional, “compassionately-motivated one-off assistance.”50 Related 
to this, the guidelines specifically discourage the involvement of medical and 
other health professionals as well as individuals belonging to organizations 
that facilitate assisted suicide. Such an approach gives rise to concerns that, 
without the relevant expertise and experience, incorrect assessments of the 
deceased’s competence might be made.51 Also of concern is the fact that at-
tempts by the unqualified to assist the deceased may lead to the latter dying 
in pain or discomfort, or experiencing the indignity in death that he or she 
was seeking to avoid.52 Further, precluding the involvement of medical and 
other health professionals may also reduce the deceased’s opportunity to 
make a decision about whether to die in light of complete and accurate in-
formation about his or her prognosis and treatment options.53 For these rea-
sons, our proposed guidelines do not treat acting in a professional capacity in 
and of itself as a factor in favour of prosecution.54 We note finally that this 
aspect of the England and Wales Guidelines is the subject of legal challenge 
by a man who wishes to end his life but whose family would not assist him. 
“Martin” is challenging the guidelines seeking that they be “clarified” so that 
he could be helped by “a member of the public … , a health professional or a 
solicitor.”55 
                                                   
50 England and Wales Interim Policy Consultation, supra note 32. See also comments 
in Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 7-8, 10. See also Williams, supra note 
38 at 192-93 and Mullock, who notes the significant weight given to this 
consideration (supra note 38). 
51 Lewis, supra note 38 at 129. Although there are aspects of assessing whether 
decision making is competent and voluntary that do not require medical expertise 
(for example, the impact of family dynamics), medical involvement in capacity 
assessments is likely to reduce error (Ost, supra note 38 at 534-37). 
52 Lewis, supra note 38 at 129-30; Seale, supra note 32; Ost, supra note 38 at 534-37; 
Mullock, supra note 38 at 452-53; Commission on Assisted Dying, supra note 32 
at 98-99. 
53 Ost, supra note 38 at 537. 
54 This is consistent with the RSC Panel, which recommended “health care 
professionals be permitted to provide assistance with suicide or voluntary 
euthanasia” (RSC Panel Report, supra note 4 at 101). The Québec Committee 
Report (supra note 5 at 82) and Madam Justice Smith (Carter, supra note 6 at para 
1393) both limit permissible assistance to physicians. 
55 Clare Dyer, “Nicklinson’s Widow is Refused Right to Appeal to Higher Court” 
(2012) 345 Brit Med J e6690. “Martin” received leave to appeal against the 
English High Court’s conclusion in R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry 
of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] 
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III. Proposed Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Guidelines 
1. Introduction 
We turn now to setting out our proposed guidelines for when prosecu-
tions should or should not occur in relation to voluntary euthanasia and as-
sisted suicide. In this effort, we are informed by our above critiques, the aca-
demic literature and case law on prosecutorial discretion in general and 
charging guidelines in particular, and the arguments presented in the RSC 
Panel Report. Although we were not able to undertake a detailed review of 
the British Columbia or the England and Wales Guidelines in this paper, we 
consider that there are sufficient concerns about those models to warrant 
starting anew and designing a set of guidelines for the Canadian context, al-
beit informed by the experience in BC and England and Wales. As part of 
that process, we start from first principles and identify three guiding princi-
ples for constructing these guidelines: respecting autonomous choice, pro-
moting high-quality decision making by prosecutors, and ensuring public 
confidence in the decisions of prosecutors. Each of these principles is dis-
cussed in more detail below.  
Having identified those principles, we are then in a position to determine 
the content of the guidelines, which we have organized into six components. 
The first component states that a public interest factor that tends in favour of, 
or against, prosecution is whether the deceased’s death occurred as a result of 
an autonomous choice made by the deceased for his or her life to end.56 The 
second and third components of the guidelines deal with how the nature of 
the deceased’s choice (if any) is to be established: what are the elements of 
an autonomous choice in the context of voluntary euthanasia and assisted su-
icide, and what is the evidence that may be directly relevant to determining 
whether those elements are present or not. For example, one element of an 
autonomous choice is that it was made voluntarily, and direct evidence of 
whether that is the case or not might include whether the suggestion to con-
sider voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide came from the deceased or 
      
EWHC 2381 that the DPP was not required to clarify his policy as requested. 
Martin’s case was heard along with the related case of Tony Nicklinson (who 
challenged the law rather than the DPP policy). Nicklinson was unsuccessful 
before the High Court and his widow (Nicklinson had subsequently died) was 
denied leave to appeal: Dyer above. 
56 We use the language of “tends in favour, or against” because some discretion is 
needed (otherwise the guidelines shift to favour ceasing to apply the law with 
obvious consequences for the rule of law).  
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from the suspect. The fourth component is comprised of factors that do not 
constitute direct evidence of whether the elements of an autonomous choice 
are present or not, but that nevertheless give confidence or raise doubts as to 
the nature of the choice. An example of this is where the suspect has a finan-
cial interest in the death of the deceased. While in such cases it is still possi-
ble to show that, as a matter of fact, an autonomous choice has been made, 
the mere presence of this factor creates a real risk that this may not be the 
case. Recognition of such “confidence factors” in the guidelines is important 
in individual cases but also in the longer term for ensuring that the public has 
confidence in these decisions and that these guidelines do not foster situa-
tions where non-autonomous choices are acted upon.  
These four components comprise the decision making content of the of-
fence-specific guidelines, and explain how a prosecutor should use each 
component in his or her decision making. Although this is explained further 
below when each component is considered in more detail, we have briefly 
indicated here the role played by each of the components and how they relate 
to each other. This is important in light of the objection expressed earlier as-
serting that the England and Wales Guidelines fail to articulate the signifi-
cance of, and the relationship between, the various factors in those guide-
lines. We anticipate the suggestion that in practice, such decision making 
may not be as nuanced and orderly as our approach. Nevertheless, deficits in 
practice do not detract from the importance of conceptual clarity in decision 
making and there is merit in attempting to articulate how decisions should be 
made in a principled way. 
The final two components relate more to process issues of decision mak-
ing than to the content of those decisions. The fifth component requires that 
decisions regarding whether or not to prosecute under the guidelines be made 
with the consent of the relevant Attorney General himself or herself. The 
sixth component establishes a reporting structure for decisions whether or 
not to prosecute. Reporting should occur in relation to individual decisions 
but systematic data should also be kept and published to ensure the system is, 
and is seen to be, working. 
It should be noted that our guidelines contemplate roles for both prosecu-
tors and the Attorney General. The first four components will, in the first in-
stance, be investigated and assessed by prosecutors. The fifth and sixth com-
ponents are the responsibility of the Attorney General. However, in under-
taking these latter roles, the Attorney General must also engage with the first 
four components. To illustrate, engaging with whether or not the deceased’s 
life ended as a result of an autonomous choice is essential when deciding 
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whether or not to prosecute and why. In doing so, the Attorney General 
would have regard to the advice of prosecutors who have conducted investi-
gations and formed views as to these matters although the ultimate decision 
as to whether a prosecution occurs remains with the Attorney General. For 
ease of reference, the discussion that follows of “prosecutors” in relation to 
the first four components will, except where the context indicates otherwise, 
include both prosecutors (as they have responsibility for these matters in the 
first instance), and the Attorney General (as the person charged with ultimate 
prosecutorial decision making responsibility). 
Turning finally to the scope and operation of the proposed guidelines: 
they are intended not to exclude, but to supplement the operation of the gen-
eral prosecutorial guidelines. Prosecutors would be required to apply the 
broader public interest considerations in the general guidelines as well as the 
additional public interest factor identified as significant for these specific of-
fences set out below.57 Our guidelines also apply only where the deceased 
was capable of making an autonomous choice for his or her life to end (that 
is, competent adults and mature minors alike, as discussed below).58 Given 
the centrality of autonomy in these guidelines, it is not appropriate that they 
govern adults or children who are incompetent. Finally, for the reasons out-
lined above,59 the guidelines apply to both voluntary euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. We note though that the operation of the general prosecutorial guide-
lines may be significant in terms of how these two situations are treated. As 
noted above,60 some of the factors in the general guidelines to be considered 
in assessing whether prosecution is in the public interest include the serious-
ness of the alleged offence and the degree of culpability of the accused. It 
may be that in particular cases of voluntary euthanasia the greater level of 
participation by the accused in the deceased’s death points more towards 
prosecution than if he or she had only assisted the deceased’s suicide. That 
will not always be the case, however, and allowing the guidelines to deal 
with both situations allows this discretion to be exercised in light of the facts 
of each case. 
 
                                                   
57 This is also the approach taken in England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12 at 
para 38. 
58 See below at “Capacity”.  
59 See above at “Prosecutorial Guidelines in England and Wales”. 
60 See above at “Prosecutorial Guidelines in Canada”. 
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2. Three Guiding Principles 
In drafting the proposed prosecutorial guidelines, we were guided by 
three principles:  
1. the critical factor that tends against prosecution is if the de-
ceased’s death occurred as a result of an autonomous choice 
made by the deceased for his or her life to end; 
2. the decision making pursuant to the prosecutorial discretion in 
this area needs to be of high-quality; and 
3. the decision making pursuant to that discretion needs to attract 
public confidence. 
We consider each in turn. 
Guiding Principle One: An Autonomous Choice 
One can find support in law for the consideration of autonomy as an ap-
propriate value underpinning these guidelines.61 The principle of autonomy 
in the medical treatment context is of fundamental importance in Canadian 
common law and is enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.62 As 
Robins, JA noted for the Ontario Court of Appeal in the well-known case of 
Fleming v Reid: 
                                                   
61 Of course, support for this idea can also be found in ethics. We do not, however, 
rely upon an ethical argument for respect for autonomy here. This is in part 
because we believe that the argument can be made without introducing the 
complexity and controversy associated with competing ethical theories about 
autonomy (contrast, for example, the conceptions of autonomy articulated in 
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), online: Bartleby <www.bartleby.com/25/2>; 
and Susan Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy and Global Threats” in Jocelyn 
Downie & Jennifer Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational 
Theory and Health Law (Victoria: University of British Columbia Press, 2011). 
We believe that it is necessary and sufficient to ground the guidelines proposed in 
this article in the conventional understanding of autonomy that underpins the law 
more generally. The guidelines can and should evolve insofar as the law evolves 
in relation to changing conceptions of autonomy within moral philosophy. We do 
not see the project in this article as contributing to or driving such change.  
62 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
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The common law right to bodily integrity and personal autono-
my is so entrenched in the traditions of our law to be ranked as 
fundamental and deserving of the highest order of protection. 
This right forms an essential part of an individual’s security of 
the person and must be included in the liberty interests protected 
by s. 7 [of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]. In-
deed, in my view, the common law right to determine what shall 
be done with one’s own body and the constitutional right to se-
curity of the person, both of which are founded on the belief in 
the dignity and autonomy of each individual, can be treated as 
co-extensive.63  
In light of its recognition by Canadian law, we consider that respect for au-
tonomy is an appropriate guiding principle to inform our approach to drafting 
guidelines that outline when prosecution may or may not be in the public in-
terest. Therefore, as argued below, we consider that the critical factor that 
tends against prosecution in such cases is if the deceased’s death occurred as 
a result of an autonomous choice made by the deceased for his or her life to 
end.64 
Guiding Principle Two: High-quality Decision Making 
A decision regarding whether or not to prosecute cases potentially in-
volving voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide is significant. Most obvi-
ously, whether a prosecution occurs in relation to a death is significant for 
the deceased. For example, a choice not to prosecute on public interest 
grounds means the taking of the deceased’s life does not, in all of the cir-
cumstances, warrant criminal sanctions. While in some instances such an 
outcome would be as the deceased had hoped, in other circumstances such a 
decision could be regarded as a failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of the death. The decision is also significant for the suspect (who may also be 
a member of the deceased’s family or a friend). A decision to prosecute im-
poses the “harms of prosecution”65 on the suspect, and he or she also faces 
the prospect of conviction for a serious criminal offence, potentially murder, 
which carries a mandatory life sentence in Canada. Finally, it is significant 
for society as a whole: the ending of another person’s life matters for the 
                                                   
63 [1991] OJ No 1083, 4 OR (3d) 74 (Ont CA) at paras 30-36.  
64 This argument is made in greater depth and at greater length in the RSC Panel 
Report, supra note 4. We rely on that text (particularly chapter three) as further 
explanation and justification for the foundation of our proposed guidelines. 
65 Rogers, supra note 43 at 787-91. 
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community,66 and so determining the appropriate criminal law response is 
important. It is therefore critical that decisions regarding whether or not to 
prosecute in such cases be of high-quality. For the purposes of this article, 
we consider high-quality decision making to require a process that is rigor-
ous, transparent, and accountable, and that results in outcomes that accurate-
ly reflect conceptually sound criteria (which here we put forward in our pro-
posed guidelines). This is particularly so given that such decisions are not 
susceptible to judicial review in Canada, except to prevent an abuse of pro-
cess.67 
The production of clear guidelines dealing with the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion in relation to cases of voluntary euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide is one way to promote high-quality decision making. As discussed 
above in Purdy, clear guidelines provide a basis for ensuring whether deci-
sions to prosecute are made predictably and consistently.68 This is a function 
of prosecution guidelines generally,69 and this claim can also be made in re-
lation to those designed for specific offences. Making the guidelines publicly 
available also helps promote high-quality decision making as prosecutorial 
decisions (even in the absence of reasons for those decisions as discussed be-
low) can attract a certain level of scrutiny that can be referenced against 
those criteria.70 
                                                   
66 The purposes and principles of sentencing outlined at section 718 of the Criminal 
Code explicitly recognize that criminal conduct harms both the victim and the 
community at large. With respect to homicide in particular, Kilpatrick J noted in R 
v VanEindhoven, 2007 NUCJ 2 at para 64, [2007] NuJ no 2 (QL): “As a family, as 
a community, as a people we are all diminished when a life is taken from us 
prematurely.” 
67 R v Power, [1994] 1 SCR 601, [1994] SCJ no 29 (QL).  
68 Purdy, supra note 29 at 395 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
69 See e.g. ON Guidelines, supra note 21; Alberta, Justice and Solicitor General, 
“Decision to Prosecute, The Criteria Governing the Decision to Commence or 
Continue Prosecution” in “Alberta Crown Prosecutors’ Policy Manual” 
(Edmonton: JSG, 20 May 2008), online: <justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/ 
criminal_pros/crown_prosecutor/Pages/decision_to_prosecute.aspx>. 
70 Andrew Ashworth, “The ‘Public Interest’ Element in Prosecutions” (1987) Issue 9 
Crim L Rev 595 at 605-06; Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 4; Marc 
Rosenberg, “The Attorney General in the 21st Century: A Tribute to Ian Scott: 
The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal Justice” (2009) 34 
Queen’s LJ 813. 
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The terms of the guidelines themselves can also establish ways in which 
high-quality decision making in this area can be promoted. One is by ensur-
ing there is rigour in the decision making process, and the requirement to 
produce reasons for decisions can help to achieve that.71 Another is by advo-
cating an open approach to the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion and 
making those reasons for decisions publicly available so that decision mak-
ing is transparent and accountable to the community.72 Developing monitor-
ing systems of longer term trends to ensure the efficacy of the guidelines and 
decision making pursuant to them can also ensure that the discretion is being 
exercised to a high standard.73 The terms of the guidelines can also support 
high-quality decision making by requiring that the Attorney General consent 
to a prosecution whether a prosecution occurs or not.74 
Guiding Principle Three: Public Confidence in Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
The third guiding principle that informs our proposed guidelines is that 
they, and the decisions made pursuant to them by prosecutors, need to retain 
public confidence. As noted above, these are significant decisions in a com-
plex and contested area and so it is important that the public has confidence 
in how they are made.75 While this guiding principle is related to the previ-
                                                   
71 David Phillip Jones & Anne S de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 5th ed 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 372-73; Sara Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, 
5th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2011) at 92. 
72 Ashworth, supra note 71 at 605-06. This is why the current England and Wales 
DPP, Keir Starmer QC, states that he makes publicly available reasons for 
decisions not to prosecute in cases that are already in the public domain (Keir 
Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 4).  
73 While not gathered in relation to prosecutorial guidelines of the sort advocated for 
in this article, the systemic data collected in the Netherlands have, for example, 
highlighted issues of concern that have then been able to be demonstrably 
addressed through changes to law and practice. See e.g. the discussion of changing 
reporting requirements and rates in Judith AC Rietjens et al, “Two Decades of 
Research on Euthanasia from the Netherlands. What Have We Learnt and What 
Questions Remain?” (2009) 6:3 J Bioeth Inq 271 at 279. 
74 See below “Component Five: Decision Consented to by the Attorney General”. 
75 Daw & Solomon, supra note 38 at 742, 750-51; Jeremy Rapke, “R (Purdy) v DPP – 
Its Implications for Prosecuting Authorities” (Paper delivered at the Conference of 
Australian and Pacific Prosecutors, October 2009). Some of the provincial 
prosecutorial guidelines explicitly recognize that wrongly exercising prosecutorial 
discretion undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. See for 
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ous one, in that high-quality decision making can attract public confidence, 
these principles are distinct and so warrant separate consideration. Public 
confidence could be had in decision making that is not of a high standard, 
and high-quality decision making will not always attract public confidence. 
One way to earn public confidence in prosecutorial decision making is 
through openness. As noted above, the public availability of the guidelines 
can make decision making more transparent, which can engender public con-
fidence in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.76 There is also scope for 
the guidelines to impose requirements designed to promote public confi-
dence. Requiring decisions to be made publicly available enables the public 
to scrutinize the exercise of the discretion and discretion – if exercised ap-
propriately – will attract public confidence.77 A similar argument applies to 
making publicly available systemic data about how the guidelines are being 
used.78 Requiring the Attorney General to consent to the decision as to 
      
example, Nova Scotia, Public Prosecution Service, “The Decision to Prosecute 
(Charge Screening)” (Halifax: PPS, 1 February 2011) at 2, online: 
<www.gov.ns.ca/pps/publications/ca_manual/ProsecutionPolicies/DecisionToPros
ecute.pdf>; Newfoundland and Labrador, Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, “Communications with the Media” in “Guidebook of Policies and 
Procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions in Newfoundland and 
Labrador” (St. John’s, ODPP, October 2007) at 10-1, online: <www.justice.gov. 
nl.ca/just/prosecutions/pp_guide_book.pdf>; Justice and Public Safety, “Guide 
Book of Policies and Procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions in 
Prince Edward Island” by the Crown Attorney’s Office (Charlottetown: JPS, 
November 2009) at 9-18, online: <www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/jps_ 
crownconduc.pdf>. The RSC Panel also noted the importance of the maintenance 
of public trust in the system (albeit in the context of its discussion of a national 
oversight commission), supra note 4 at 102.  
76 Ashworth, supra note 71 at 605-06; Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 4.  
77 Louis Blom-Cooper, “Reasons For Not Prosecuting” (2000) PL 560; Ashworth, 
supra note 71 at 605-06; Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 4. 
78 For example, the public availability of data about the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon 
and Washington State as to the practice of voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted 
suicide has made it possible for the public to see that claims about slippery slopes 
and risks to vulnerable groups (such as the poor, the elderly, people from ethnic 
backgrounds and people with disabilities) are demonstrably false. See e.g. Rietjens 
et al, supra note 74; Kenneth Chambaere et al, “Trends in Medical End-of-Life 
Decision Making in Flanders, Belgium 1998-2001-2007” (2011) 31:3 Med Decis 
Mak 500. See also data available on the websites of the Oregon Health Authority, 
online: <public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/ 
DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/index.aspx> and the Washington State Department of 
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whether or not to prosecute in these cases can also promote public confi-
dence in the guidelines. 
Of course, one could argue that all decisions should be made well and 
should attract public confidence, and that the guiding principles of high-
quality decision making – and public confidence in the exercise of this dis-
cretion – should apply not only in relation to the offences being discussed in 
this article, but to all offences. Indeed, many of the factors identified above 
could be applied or adapted to other offences, particularly those of a serious 
nature. However, because of the nature of the conduct at issue and the novel-
ty of the approach (effectively allowing that some instances of assisted sui-
cide and voluntary euthanasia do not warrant prosecution), decisions as to 
whether or not prosecuting a case involving voluntary euthanasia or assisted 
      
Health, online: <www.doh.wa.gov/dwda/>. Of course there are authors who argue 
that there is empirical evidence of slippery slopes and risks to vulnerable groups. 
Evidence from these authors was introduced into court in Carter, supra note 6 
listed at para 160. See e.g. John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An 
Argument Against Legalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, “Care Not Killing: Considering Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: An Evaluation of Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill” 
(Georgetown University, 2006), online: <kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/files/ 
Keown_report.pdf>; Emily Jackson & John Keown, Debating Euthanasia 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011); Herbert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, “Physician-
Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Medical Perspective” (2008) 106 Mich L Rev 
1613; Jose Pereira, “Legalizing Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide: The Illusion Of 
Safeguards and Controls” (2011) 18:2 Current Oncology 38. However, following 
cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel, Madam Justice Smith concluded that: 
“An absolute prohibition might be called for if the evidence from permissive 
jurisdictions showed abuse of patients, or carelessness or callousness on the part of 
physicians, or evidence of the reality of a practical slippery slope. 
 However, that is not what the evidence shows. I have found that the evidence 
supports the conclusion that a system with properly designed and administered 
safeguards could, with a very high degree of certainty, prevent vulnerable persons 
from being induced to commit suicide while permitting exceptions for competent, 
fully-informed persons acting voluntarily to receive physician-assisted death” 
(Carter, supra note 6 at 1365-66). Furthermore, a rebuttal of Jose Pereira’s paper 
was recently published in Current Oncology (the same journal that published his 
paper), and the journal contemporaneously acknowledged that his paper was an 
“opinion” rather than a peer-reviewed paper and issued a correction: Jocelyn 
Downie et al, “Pereira’s Attack On Legalizing Euthanasia Or Assisted Suicide: 
Smoke and Mirrors” (2012) 19:3 Current Oncology 133 and Jose Pereira, 
“Erratum: Legalizing Euthanasia Or Assisted Suicide: The Illusion Of Safeguards 
and Controls” (2012) 19:3 Current Oncology e227. 
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suicide is in the public interest can give rise to a particularly high level of 
community interest, and sometimes concern.79 We therefore believe it to be 
especially important to explicitly articulate these guiding principles here.  
3. Six Components 
Component One: An Additional Public Interest Factor - Autonomous Choice 
As outlined above, respect for autonomy is one of the guiding principles 
we used when constructing the proposed prosecutorial guidelines, and 
whereas high-quality decision making and public confidence are directed at 
least in part to procedural matters, respect for autonomy makes a greater con-
tribution to determining the content of the guidelines. Accordingly, we place 
autonomy at the centre of our approach and identify whether the deceased’s 
death occurred as a result of his or her autonomous choice as the sole addi-
tional public interest factor. As noted above, this does not preclude consider-
ation of the broader public interest factors contained in the general prosecu-
torial guidelines. Rather, these proposed guidelines add a factor for prosecu-
tors to consider that is specifically tailored for this context. 
Guidelines text 
Autonomous Choice: an Additional Public Interest Factor Specific to 
These Offences 
An additional public interest factor that tends against prosecution is that 
the deceased’s death occurred as a result of an autonomous choice made by the 
deceased for his or her life to end. 
An additional public interest factor that tends in favour of prosecution is 
that the deceased’s death did not occur as a result of an autonomous choice 
made by the deceased for his or her life to end. 
 
Components Two and Three: Elements and Direct Evidence of an Autono-
mous Choice  
In this section, we develop the second and third components of the pro-
posed guidelines. The second component identifies how the nature of the de-
ceased’s choice is to be established (through the satisfaction of three ele-
ments) and the third component sets out an inclusive list of the direct evi-
                                                   
79 For evidence of this high level of community interest and concern in the England 
and Wales, see England and Wales Interim Policy Summary, supra note 33.  
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dence that may be relevant in assessing whether or not those three elements 
have been satisfied or not.  
The three elements that need to be satisfied for the deceased’s death to 
have occurred as a result of his or her autonomous choice are: 
1. the deceased was capable of making the decision to end his or 
her life; 
2. the decision was made voluntarily by the deceased; and 
3. the deceased was offered sufficient information in relation to the 
decision to end his or her life.  
These elements are derived from the law applying to the refusal of medical 
treatment. Although not entirely apposite to cases of voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, the law with respect to refusals provides a useful depar-
ture point (one, we note, that was taken by the England and Wales Guide-
lines).80  
Capacity 
The common law presumes that every adult is capable of making medical 
treatment decisions.81 However, this presumption may be rebutted by evi-
dence to the contrary. The test for capacity is decision specific; an individual 
may have the capacity to consent to a routine procedure such as a blood test 
but lack the necessary capacity to consent to deep brain stimulation. Capacity 
may also fluctuate over time.82 An individual will be judged to have deci-
sional capacity if that person has the ability to understand the information 
that is relevant to making the decision in question and the foreseeable risks 
and consequences of undergoing, or refusing to undergo, the proposed treat-
ment.83 The common law presumption of capacity does not extend to minors. 
                                                   
80 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12 at para 43(2).  
81 C (JS) v Wren (1986), [1987] 76 AR 118, (sub nom C v Wren) 35 DLR (4th) 419 
(CA); Starson v Swayze, 2003 SCC 32 at para 7, [2003] 1 SCR 722. 
82 Ibid at para 118. 
83 In some provinces and territories, this test has been codified in legislation. See e.g. 
Personal Directives Act, RSA 2000, c P-6, s 1(b); Health Care (Consent) and 
Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 1996, c 181, s 7 [HCCACFAA]; The Health 
Care Directives Act, SM 1992, c 33, CCSM c H27, s 2; Personal Directives Act, 
SNWT 2005, c 16, s1; Hospitals Act, RSNS 1989, c 208, s 52(2A); Health Care 
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Instead, children and adolescents are entitled to a degree of decisional auton-
omy commensurate with their level of maturity.84 
Evidence that is relevant to determining whether a deceased had capacity 
or not includes whether he or she had a recent capacity assessment undertak-
en by an appropriately qualified medical or other health professional. Also 
relevant is whether the deceased was in need of assistance to make decisions 
about other aspects of his or her life. Although capacity is specific to the par-
ticular decision to be made, findings of incapacity in other realms can some-
times shed light on whether the deceased had capacity to choose for his or 
her life to end. 
Voluntariness 
Once again building upon the law that governs refusal of medical treat-
ment, a decision to commit suicide must also be free of undue influence.85 It 
is worth noting though that not all influence will be undue provided the deci-
sion remains that of the person; it is legitimate for others – such as family, 
friends, and doctors – to provide advice and even seek to dissuade the per-
son.86 Evidence relevant to the voluntary nature of the decision includes 
      
Consent Act, SO 1996, c 2, s 4(1); Consent to Treatment and Health Care 
Directives Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-17.2, s 7(1) [CTHCDA]; Health Care Directives 
and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, SS 1997, c H-0.001, s 2(1)(b); 
Care Consent Act, SY 2003, c 21, s 6(2). 
84 In the recent case of AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 
SCC 30 at para 87, [2009] 2 SCR 181, Abella J, for the majority, held that even in 
cases of a refusal of life-saving treatment, “a minor may be of sufficient maturity 
that [the distinction between] the principles of welfare and autonomy will collapse 
altogether and the child’s wishes will become the controlling factor.” 
85 Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 28, 74 BCLR (2d) 2. A number of 
provinces and territories have codified the elements of consent, including 
voluntariness, in legislation. See e.g. HCCACFAA, supra note 84 at s 6; Health 
Care Consent Act, supra note 84 at s 11(1); CTHCDA, supra note 84 at s 6(1); 
Care Consent Act, supra note 84 at s 5. 
86 Barney Sneiderman, John C Irvine & Philip H Osborne, Canadian Medical Law, 3d 
ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 31. See also Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) (1992), [1993] Fam 95 at 121, [1992] 4 All ER 649 (CA), where the 
Court of Appeal found that a woman’s refusal of treatment was not binding on the 
treating team; Staughton LJ considered that influence will be undue only if there is 
“such a degree of external influence as to persuade the patient to depart from her 
own wishes.” This case is referenced in Canadian secondary sources such as Ellen 
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whether there was any pressure placed on the deceased in his or her decision 
making: whether the suggestion for taking such steps originally came from 
the deceased, and whether there was a clear and unequivocal request from 
the deceased for assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. 
Deceased Offered Sufficient Information 
Our proposed guidelines require that the deceased be offered sufficient 
information about the decision to end his or her life including, where appro-
priate, information from qualified medical or other health professionals. 
Since Hopp v Lepp87 and Reibl v Hughes88, Canadian law has recognized that 
medical and other health professionals have a duty to offer all information 
that a reasonable person in the position of the patient would want to know 
about the recommended treatment, alternatives to this treatment, and the con-
sequences of not undergoing any treatment. The Supreme Court of Canada’s 
reasoning in both decisions was based on autonomy: a person can only make 
a meaningful choice to undertake or refuse treatment with relevant infor-
mation about what that treatment involves, including its potential risks. 
Recognition of the need for an autonomous decision requires that the de-
ceased was offered such information. 
Evidence as to whether sufficient information has been offered to the de-
ceased will include evidence about the nature of the information offered to 
the deceased, such as whether it included relevant information about the di-
agnosis, prognosis, and treatment options for a person’s illness or disability 
(if any), other care options including palliative care, the nature of possible 
methods of voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide and associated risks, and 
the consequences of alternative courses of action. Further evidence that is 
relevant to the sufficiency of information offered to the deceased is whether 
any of that information was misleading or inaccurate, whether the deceased 
had already gathered some or all of the relevant information on his or her 
own, and whether the information offered was in a form that the deceased 
could understand.  
 
      
Picard & Gerald Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada, 
4th ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007). 
87 [1980] 2 SCR 192, 4 WWR 645. 
88 [1980] 2 SCR 880, 114 DLR (3d) 1.  
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Guidelines text 
Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
The elements of an autonomous choice by the deceased for his or her life 
to end are: 
1. The deceased was capable of making the decision to end his or her life; 
2. The decision was made voluntarily by the deceased; and 
3. The deceased was offered sufficient information in relation to the deci-
sion to end his or her life.  
Direct Evidence in Relation to the Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
Factors that may be relevant to determining whether the deceased’s death 
occurred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her include: 
• Whether the deceased had been assessed recently as having capacity to 
make the decision to end his or her life by an appropriately qualified 
medical or other health professional (capacity); 
• Whether the deceased needed assistance to make decisions about other 
aspects of his or her life (capacity); 
• Whether there was a clear and unequivocal request from the deceased for 
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide (voluntary); 
• Whether the suggestion to consider voluntary euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide came from the deceased or from the suspect or others (voluntary); 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the deceased’s 
decision was not brought about by pressure or coercion (voluntary); and 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the deceased was 
offered sufficient information about the decision including, where ap-
propriate, by qualified medical or other health professionals (infor-
mation). 
 
Component Four: Confidence Whether Death Occurred as a Result of Au-
tonomous Choice 
The proposed guidelines also include factors that are relevant to a prose-
cutor’s confidence about whether the death that occurred was the result of an 
autonomous choice by the deceased (“confidence factors”). The role of these 
factors is different from those mentioned in the previous section, where the 
goal was to identify matters that could be used as direct evidence in relation 
to whether the three elements of an autonomous choice discussed above were 
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satisfied. The factors in this section do not have that same direct probative 
value and so cannot be used in that way.  
Two examples of confidence factors are where the suspect has an interest 
that conflicts with the interest of the deceased in making an autonomous 
choice about death (conflict of interest), and where there is a history of vio-
lence or abuse towards the deceased by the suspect. These factors are not di-
rect evidence of an absence of autonomy, as it is possible that decisions that 
occur in the presence of such factors can still be autonomous and therefore 
not give rise to prosecution. For example, a DPP who was firmly satisfied 
that a deceased had made an autonomous choice to die, in spite of the exist-
ence of potentially negative confidence factors, would be justified under our 
guidelines in not prosecuting. Nevertheless, the presence of these circum-
stances can give rise to real doubts that such a choice has been made. This 
risk is sufficient to justify addressing them in the guidelines.  
One of the guiding principles for constructing these guidelines is the im-
portance of public confidence in prosecutorial decision making. If circum-
stances raising doubt that there was an autonomous choice are specifically 
addressed, the public can have confidence that prosecutorial discretion is on-
ly being exercised to decline to prosecute in clear cases of autonomous deci-
sion making.  
Also included in this section are confidence factors that are indirectly 
about autonomy. An example is whether a suspect reported the deceased’s 
death to the police or coroner, and co-operated with the investigation into the 
death. Such action is not directly about whether the death occurred as a result 
of an autonomous choice. However, reporting and co-operation by a suspect 
might suggest that his or her behaviour is more likely to be consistent with 
the non-prosecution factors in the guidelines than if the suspect concealed his 
or her involvement. Given that the non-prosecution factors are based on the 
deceased making an autonomous choice, these factors can still, albeit indi-
rectly, give rise to confidence or doubts as to the nature of any choice made 
by the deceased.  
These confidence factors have two functions in the guidelines. The first 
is that factors which give rise to doubts about whether the deceased made an 
autonomous choice for his or her life to end act as triggers for further inves-
tigation or scrutiny of the circumstances in which the death occurred. The 
presence of these confidence factors is a warning that should prompt a prose-
cutor to review even more closely the direct evidence in relation to the ele-
ments of an autonomous choice in the case at hand. We note that confidence 
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factors can also provide reassurance that the deceased chose to die, but we 
are not proposing a reduced level of scrutiny in such cases. The second func-
tion of confidence factors is that they must be used by prosecutors in their 
deliberations when weighing the direct evidence of the elements of an auton-
omous choice set out above. To illustrate, the existence of a troubling con-
flict of interest is an important part of the context in which prosecutors would 
assess the available direct evidence about whether the deceased was capable 
of making a voluntary decision. We now consider the four confidence factors 
we include in our proposed guidelines. 
History of Violence or Abuse 
A history of violence or abuse by the suspect towards the deceased gives 
rise to real concerns about whether the deceased made an autonomous choice 
for his or her life to end. Such abuse need not be physical in nature and can 
include emotional or psychological abuse. While it is possible for a decision 
to end one’s life to be made autonomously despite that history, the existence 
of this type of relationship between the suspect and the deceased casts doubt 
over this and poses a risk as to whether or not the decision was autono-
mous.89 Accordingly, the guidelines identify this factor as one that should 
trigger very close scrutiny of the circumstances in which the death occurred. 
A prosecutor should weigh any available evidence as to whether the de-
ceased made an autonomous choice in light of this history. Part of this may 
include accessing information or advice about the dynamics of such relation-
ships and the impact that any violence or abuse may have had on the de-
ceased’s capacity to make his or her own choices.  
Settled Decision 
A confidence factor which may point the other way is that the deceased’s 
decision appeared to be a settled one (that is, that the deceased is not ambiva-
lent about his or her death). One way this could be demonstrated is through 
repeated requests by the deceased for his or her life to end. We note that the 
settled nature of a decision is not an element of an autonomous choice: it is 
                                                   
89 For a discussion of some of the evidence as to the impact that a history of violence 
and/or coercion can have autonomy, albeit in the case of domestic violence, see 
Tamara Kuennen, “Analysing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence 
Victims: How Much is Too Much?” (2007) 22 Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law 
& Justice 1. See also Cheryl Hanna, “The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan 
Stark’s Coercive Control into Legal Doctrine for Abused Women” (2009) 15 
Violence Against Women 1458. 
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not part of the law that governs the refusal of medical treatment discussed 
above. Nevertheless, if a decision appears to be a settled one, then a prosecu-
tor, and indeed the public, could have greater confidence that the choice was 
autonomous. However, as noted above, we are not suggesting this should 
lead to a lower level of scrutiny than that which generally occurs in these 
cases. 
Conflict of Interest 
One factor tending to undermine confidence that the deceased’s death 
occurred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her is that there is an 
interest on the part of the suspect that conflicts with the interest of the de-
ceased in making that choice. Sometimes the nature of the conflict is such 
that it tempts the suspect to coerce the deceased or otherwise undermine free 
choice. Other times the conflict might not be in direct opposition to a de-
ceased’s autonomy, but might instead indicate that the suspect was careless 
or disinterested in ensuring that death was genuinely the deceased’s choice. 
In both instances, however, the existence of a conflict creates the risk that the 
deceased is not making an autonomous choice: this is what warrants inclu-
sion of conflict of interest as a confidence factor in the guidelines.  
There is a range of interests that can give rise to this conflict. One is 
where a suspect has a financial interest in the deceased’s death. The obvious 
example is where the suspect or a person close to him or her will benefit fi-
nancially through an inheritance. A financial conflict of interest can also 
arise not because of the deceased’s death, but because a suspect is financially 
remunerated for providing assistance of some kind. This could arise in rela-
tion to an organization that facilitates voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide 
for a fee. Another such example is where a medical or other health profes-
sional participates in the deceased’s death and is remunerated for that. Other 
conflicts of interest may be non-financial: e.g., a suspect may have reputa-
tional interests which may be in conflict with the deceased’s autonomous 
choice. A suspect may also wish to be relieved of the burden of caring for the 
deceased.  
Under our proposed guidelines, the presence of a conflict of interest will 
trigger a prosecutor to closely scrutinize the circumstances of the deceased’s 
death and to weigh the evidence in relation to the nature of any choice made 
by the deceased in light of that conflict. The level of this additional scrutiny 
and deliberation will depend, however, on the nature of the conflict and the 
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extent to which the suspect’s own interests were significant in the decision to 
end the deceased’s life or provide assistance to do so.90  
The nature of the conflict will determine the extent of additional scrutiny 
and deliberation required. The issue here is whether the potential for the sus-
pect to benefit is either, firstly, so remote so that it is of no consequence for 
the suspect, or secondly, if it is not too remote, whether it is insufficient to be 
a relevant factor in the decision to end, or to assist with ending, the de-
ceased’s life. It is this second issue that will be most significant in this con-
text. It is ultimately a matter for the prosecutor to determine, on the facts of 
the case, how concerned he or she should be by the conflict of interest. To il-
lustrate, an inheritance for a suspect will automatically trigger additional 
scrutiny and deliberation, but a prosecutor will need to determine the extent 
to which it could be regarded as a relevant factor in the suspect’s decision 
making process. We consider that very close scrutiny would be called for 
where the suspect’s financial circumstances had recently changed for the 
worse and this seemed to prompt a renewed interest in assisting the deceased. 
By contrast, a medical or other health professional who received payment for 
providing a medical or other health service as part of their usual care for a 
patient is unlikely to have considered that remuneration a relevant factor in 
their decision to be involved in the death. More scrutiny will be required, 
however, if that professional had established a practice devoted exclusively 
or primarily with assisting people to die, and consequently depended on vol-
untary euthanasia or assisted suicide for his or her livelihood.91  
Reporting the Death 
The guidelines include as a confidence factor whether or not the suspect 
reported the death to the police or coroner and co-operated fully with its in-
                                                   
90 This approach has similarities to the “common sense” one outlined in the England 
and Wales guidelines where a suspect may obtain a benefit from the deceased’s 
death but that this need not be a factor in favour of prosecution if “compassion 
was the only driving force” for his or her actions. See England and Wales 
Guidelines, supra note 12 at para 44.  
91 We note that earlier in this paper we argued against treating “acting in a 
professional capacity in and of itself” as a factor tending in favour of prosecution, 
see England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12. This is not an inconsistency. 
The fact that a medical or other health professional is involved in voluntary 
euthanasia or assisted suicide in a professional capacity does not of itself point 
towards prosecution. However, if that involvement gives rise to a conflict of 
interest then that must be considered by a prosecutor as a confidence factor. 
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vestigation. How a suspect behaves in this regard can inform a prosecutor’s 
confidence as to whether a person’s death occurred in conformity with the 
non-prosecution factors in the guidelines which, as noted above, goes indi-
rectly to the confidence a prosecutor can have in relation to whether there 
was an autonomous choice by the deceased. While there can be other motiva-
tions, one reason why a suspect may feel able to report the death to police or 
coroner is that they will not be prosecuted based on the criteria in the guide-
lines. By contrast, it could be argued that a suspect whose involvement in a 
death points towards the factors in favour of prosecution would be more like-
ly to conceal the death or his or her involvement in it, or refuse to participate 
in a police or coroner’s investigation, for fear of the adverse consequences.92  
Assuming that these arguments are correct, then reporting and co-
operation is an appropriate confidence factor for the guidelines. As with oth-
er confidence factors, a troubling response warrants additional scrutiny and 
deliberation whereas a comforting response does not reduce the rigour of a 
prosecutor’s approach, but is relevant to deliberations as to how any evi-
dence in relation to an autonomous choice is weighed.  
We also note that including this particular factor has additional systemic 
benefits for how the guidelines operate above and beyond deliberations in 
particular cases. Incentivizing disclosure of cases involving voluntary eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide so they may be investigated adds to the public con-
fidence that potential suspects are acting, and will in the future act, in ac-
cordance with the guidelines. It also bolsters the public reporting of cases in-
volving the guidelines (proposed below), which again promotes public con-
fidence that the guidelines are functioning appropriately. 
Guidelines text 
Confidence Whether Death Occurred as a Result of Autonomous Choice 
 
The presence of factors that give confidence that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her does not reduce the 
scrutiny that the circumstances of the death receive. Such factors can, howev-
                                                   
92 Of course, there could also be other motivations for not reporting the death to police 
or coroner and co-operating with its investigation. For example, a person whose 
conduct is otherwise unlikely to attract prosecution may not be aware of the 
guidelines and so conceal his or her involvement in the death for fear of 
prosecution.  
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er, be used in weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether the 
elements of an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• The deceased’s decision for his or her life to end appeared to be a settled 
one; and 
• The suspect reported the death to the police or coroner within a reasona-
ble time and co-operated fully with the investigation. 
The presence of factors that raise doubts that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her triggers additional 
scrutiny of the circumstances of the death. Such factors can also be used in 
weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether the elements of 
an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• There is a history of violence or abuse by the suspect towards the de-
ceased; 
• There is an interest on the part of the suspect that conflicts with the inter-
est of the deceased in making an autonomous choice about death. In de-
termining the level of additional scrutiny and deliberation that is re-
quired, regard must be given to the likelihood of the conflict arising and 
whether the interest is such as to be a relevant factor in the suspect’s de-
cision making; and 
• The suspect did not report the death to the police or coroner within a rea-
sonable time or did not co-operate fully with the investigation. 
 
Component Five: Decision Consented To By the Attorney General 
It was noted above that two of the principles that inform how the guide-
lines are constructed are:  
1. the decision making pursuant to the prosecutorial discretion in 
this area needs to be of high-quality; and 
2. the decision making pursuant to that discretion needs to attract 
public confidence. 
One way in which these goals can be promoted is by requiring that decisions 
whether or not to prosecute under the guidelines be consented to by the At-
torney General. We note that this is consistent with Canadian jurisdictions al-
ready having provisions dealing with when the Attorney General’s consent is 
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specifically required either to bring or to discontinue a prosecution.93 Such an 
approach is also largely consistent with the position in England and Wales, 
although the DPP’s role in that jurisdiction is given legislative force – sec-
tion 2(4) of the Suicide Act, 1961 (UK)94 provides that proceedings under 
that Act may be instituted only with the consent of the DPP. However, there 
are some important differences between the position there and what is being 
proposed in these guidelines. First, our proposed guidelines rest the consent 
requirement with the Attorney General rather than, as is done in England and 
Wales, with the DPP. We would argue that it is better to have the consent 
rest at the highest point of public accountability in all jurisdictions (which is 
the Attorney General even in those few jurisdictions with a statutorily inde-
pendent DPP).95 Also, it seems unwise to have the consent on a matter such 
as this rest at different levels of political superintendence and public ac-
countability in different jurisdictions (and given the different approaches tak-
en in different provinces and territories, it would have to rest with the DPP in 
some jurisdictions and with the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in others). Second, our proposed guidelines are broader than the position 
in England and Wales in that the DPP’s consent is only required if a prosecu-
tion is instituted. The DPP is not required by the Act to make decisions 
where it is proposed that a person not be prosecuted; his or her role is only 
mandated where there is a decision to prosecute. We understand, however, 
that the approach taken to date is for the DPP to be involved in all decisions 
(including those not to prosecute),96 which is consistent with our proposed 
approach.  
Another key difference relates to the wider function of the consent provi-
sion in England and Wales. The House of Lords in Purdy identified that the 
“basic reason” for the relevant subsection is to prevent the risk of prosecu-
tions in “inappropriate circumstances.”97 A significant motivation for impos-
ing a legislative requirement for DPP consent to prosecutions is to avoid 
                                                   
93 For example, Criminal Code, supra note 2 s 477.2(1) (offences committed in or on 
territorial sea of Canada) and s 4.1 (offence in relation to sexual offences against 
children committed outside Canada) require the consent of the Attorney General 
of Canada. See e.g. Ontario, Ministry of Attorney General, “Attorney General’s 
Consents” in “Crown Policy Manual” (Toronto: MAG, 21 March 2005), online: 
<www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/AGConsents.pdf>.  
94 England and Wales Guidelines, supra note 12; Suicide Act, 1961 (UK), c 60, s 2(1). 
95 Nova Scotia, Québec, and federal. 
96 Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40. 
97 Purdy, supra note 29 at 392 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
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vexatious or inappropriate private prosecutions.98 Our proposed guidelines 
do not directly address this concern as they only purport to guide the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion by the State and cannot in and of themselves, un-
like a legislative requirement for consent, prevent inappropriate private pros-
ecutions.  
Nevertheless, despite these differences, some of the rationales for section 
2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961 (UK) are relevant to the proposed fifth compo-
nent of our guidelines. In particular, we note that the House of Lords in 
Purdy pointed to reasons underpinning the consent requirement as including 
“to secure consistency of practice, … to enable account to be taken of miti-
gating factors and to provide some central control of the use of the criminal 
law where it has to intrude into areas which are particularly sensitive or con-
troversial.”99 We agree and consider that requiring the Attorney General to 
consent to all decisions whether to prosecute or not under these guidelines 
will provide central control and lead to greater consistency and predictability 
in decision making. These factors would also promote public confidence in 
decisions made pursuant to the guidelines. 
Guidelines text 
Decision Consented to by the Attorney General 
All decisions whether or not to prosecute cases involving voluntary eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide pursuant to these guidelines must be consented to by 
the Attorney General. 
 
Component Six: Public Reporting of Decision Making 
Another way in which high-quality decision making that attracts public 
confidence can be promoted is through giving reasons for decisions and mak-
ing them publicly available. We propose this be done where possible in rela-
tion to individual decisions not to prosecute, but also through the collection 
and publication of information about how the guidelines are operating at a 
systemic level. 
                                                   
98 For a wider discussion of the importance of the right to bring a private prosecution, 
and the corresponding justifications advanced for requiring DPP or other consents 
to prosecution, see UK, Law Commission, Consents to Prosecution (Law Com No 
255) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1998) at paras 2-3. See also 
Purdy, supra note 29 at 392 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
99 Purdy, supra note 29 at 392 (Lord Hope of Craighead); Williams, supra note 38 at 
184-85. 
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Reasons for Decisions 
Subject to any contrary legal obligations prohibiting such a course, pros-
ecutors are able to give reasons for their prosecutorial decisions and make 
them publicly available.100 In British Columbia, a commission of inquiry 
made the following recommendation, which has been adopted by the Crown: 
Where a decision not to prosecute has been made, and the pub-
lic, a victim or other significantly interested person is aware of 
the police investigation, it is in the public interest that the public, 
victim or other significantly interested person be given adequate 
reasons for the non-prosecution, by either the police or Crown 
Counsel.101 
In Prince Edward Island, prosecutors are advised to keep a record of the rea-
sons for a decision not to prosecute, and to be conscious of the need in ap-
propriate cases to explain the reasons for the decision to affected parties.102 
                                                   
100 Indeed in Canada, the common law imposes a duty on administrative decision 
makers to provide reasons in certain circumstances “where the decision has 
important significance for the individual, when there is a statutory right of appeal, 
or in other circumstances” (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 48, 174 DLR (4th)).  
101 British Columbia, Discretion to Prosecute Inquiry: Commissioner’s Report (“The 
Owen Inquiry”) (Victoria: Discretion to Prosecute Inquiry, 1990) at 110, 118, 
Recommendation 8(2). Section 15(4) of the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165 facilitates compliance with this 
recommendation: 
15(4) The head of a public body must not refuse, after a police investigation 
is completed, to disclose under this section the reasons for a decision not to 
prosecute 
(a) to a person who knew of and was significantly interested in the 
investigation, including a victim or a relative or friend of a victim, or 
(b) to any other member of the public, if the fact of the investigation 
was made public. 
  See also British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General, “Disclosure of 
Information to Parties other than the Accused” in “Crown Counsel Policy 
Manual” by the Criminal Justice Branch (Victoria: MAG, 18 November 2005), 
online: <www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/DIS1.1-Disclo 
sureOfInformationtToParties-18Nov2005.pdf>. 
102 Justice and Public Safety, “Guide Book of Policies and Procedures for the Conduct 
of Criminal Prosecutions in Prince Edward Island” by the Crown Attorneys’ 
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According to the guidelines: “this approach will encourage reasoned decision 
making.”103 The Newfoundland guidelines explicitly recognize that public 
confidence in the administration of justice may require the giving of reasons 
where appropriate.104 Several other provinces have guidelines dealing with 
media interaction that acknowledge that public confidence is enhanced by 
the timely provision of accurate information to the public.105 In Alberta, 
however, prosecutors are instructed to refuse the release of information on 
any file where a decision has been made not to prosecute.106 
To advance the guiding principles of high-quality decision making and 
public confidence, the guidelines should require that where possible, reasons 
for decisions be given in these cases and made publicly available. We note, 
however, that this aspect of the guidelines applies only to decisions not to 
prosecute, and not to decisions favouring a prosecution. Aside from concerns 
about prejudicing either the Crown’s ability to prosecute or the accused’s 
right to a fair trial, a decision to prosecute means the Crown’s case is sub-
      
Office (Charlottetown: JPS, November 2009) at 5-7, online: <www.gov.pe.ca/ 
photos/original/jps_crownconduc.pdf>.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, “Communications with the Media” 
in “Guidebook of Policies and Procedures for the Conduct of Criminal 
Prosecutions in Newfoundland and Labrador” (St. John’s: ODPP, October 2007) 
at 10-1, online: <www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/prosecutions/pp_guide_book.pdf>.  
105 See e.g. Nova Scotia, Public Prosecution Service, “Media Inquiries and Public 
Statements” in “Crown Attorney Manual” (Halifax: PPS, 4 July 2011), online: 
<www.gov.ns.ca/pps/publications/ca_manual/AdministrativePolicies/MediaRelati
ons.pdf>; Ontario, Ministry of Attorney General, “Media Contact by Crown 
Counsel by the Criminal in “Crown Policy Manual” by the Law Policy Branch 
(Toronto, MAG, 21 March 2005), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ 
english/crim/cpm/2005/MediaContactByCrown.pdf>; Manitoba, Department of 
Justice, “Communication with the News Media” in “Prosecution Policies” by the 
Manitoba Prosecution Service (Winnipeg, DOJ, November 2008), online: 
<www.gov.mb.ca/justice/prosecutions/ policy/index.html>. 
106 Section 20(6) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSA 
2000, c F-25 provides that the head of a public body may disclose reasons for a 
decision not to prosecute to the public. However, the Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General instructs prosecutors to rely on s 20(1)(g), which permits the 
head of a public body to refuse to disclose information that could reasonably be 
expected to reveal any information relating to or used in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. Although this exemption is found in the legislation of 
several provinces, only prosecutors in Alberta have been explicitly advised to 
consistently rely on it to deny information regarding decisions not to prosecute.  
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jected to the public rigour of the criminal justice system, and this is sufficient 
to address the guiding principles of high-quality decision making and public 
confidence identified above. 
There are a number of benefits in publishing reasons for decisions. One 
is that the discipline of producing written reasons assists a decision maker in 
his or her deliberations and ensures the reasoning is subjected to the rigour of 
justification, thereby promoting high-quality decision making.107 Requiring 
justification of a conclusion to the public also ensures accountability and 
transparency in decision making, which in turn supports public confi-
dence.108 A third benefit is that awareness of how these decisions are made 
promotes predictability and consistency in decision making, and certainty in 
the law.109 This is of advantage for prosecutors and the Attorneys General, as 
this body of knowledge would enhance their deliberations in relation to these 
decisions. It also assists members of the public who will not only know the 
general criteria for prosecution decisions, but also how those criteria are be-
ing applied in practice. This will enable people to regulate their own conduct 
so as to ensure, if possible, that it is not in the public interest for them to be 
prosecuted. 
While these benefits are applicable generally to the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion, we consider the case for published reasons for decisions is 
particularly compelling in relation to voluntary euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide. As the experience in England and Wales has demonstrated, prosecuto-
rial discretion in this area can give rise to a high level of public interest and 
concern about how it may be exercised.110 It is therefore appropriate that the 
public be able to scrutinize these decisions, and be reassured they are being 
made in accordance with the guidelines. These concerns have prompted the 
DPP in England and Wales to make publicly available the reasons for his de-
cisions in relation to the assisted suicide guidelines where the information 
about the case is already in the public domain.111 Accordingly, although the 
majority of guidelines already address in a generic way the issue of reasons 
                                                   
107 Jones & de Villars, supra note 72 at 372-73; Blake, supra note 72 at 92.  
108 Jones & de Villars, supra note 72; Blake, supra note 72.  
109 Jones & de Villars, supra note 72; Blake, supra note 72. 
110 See England and Wales Interim Policy Summary, supra note 33. 
111 Keir Starmer Transcript, supra note 40 at 4. See e.g. The Crown Prosecution 
Service, “The Suicide of Mr Raymond Cutkelvin: Decision on Prosecution” (25 
June 2010), online: CPS <www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/the_suicide_of_ mr_ 
raymond_cutkelvin_decision_on_prosecution/>. 
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for decisions, we consider it should be specifically dealt with in these guide-
lines, and that reasons for decisions should be provided and made public 
wherever possible. 
We do recognize, however, that the context of prosecutorial decision 
making means that there are constraints that may limit or preclude giving full 
reasons or making reasons publicly available. Attorneys General are subject 
to various legislative privacy obligations which, absent a relevant exception, 
prohibit publication of certain information.112 Some or all of these obliga-
tions may not apply, however, in relation to information that is already in the 
public domain (for example, where information is discussed in open court at 
a committal hearing and the prosecution is later discontinued). Another rele-
vant consideration is whether the production and publication of reasons 
would prejudice the prosecution of a co-offender or an ongoing investigation. 
Other public interest considerations which may weigh against giving reasons 
are if doing so would significantly prejudice the administration of justice or 
cause serious harm to witnesses or the suspect. Accordingly, it will not al-
ways be possible to produce and publish reasons for decisions. Nevertheless, 
we consider the publication of reasons should be the presumed norm and 
where publication of reasons is not possible, consideration should also be 
given to whether it is possible to publish reasons of some kind that do not 
prejudice those other obligations. For example, it might be possible to make 
reasons for a decision available in a de-identified form, or for the reasons not 
to refer to particular information that should not be disclosed. 
Systemic Data Reporting in Annual Report 
Another way in which high-quality decision making that attracts public 
confidence can be promoted is to monitor how the guidelines are working at 
a systemic level. This permits a level of scrutiny of global trends to ensure 
that the guidelines are leading to appropriate outcomes. Such an approach is 
generally a feature of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide laws which 
establish or empower a Commission or other body to oversee the administra-
                                                   
112 See e.g. Privacy Act, RSC, 1985, c P-21; Freedom of Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act, SNS 1993, c 5; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act, SM 1997, c 50, CCSM c F175; Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F-31; Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1.  
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tion of the legislation.113 Again, this information should be made available 
for public scrutiny.  
The reporting of systemic data (which can be done in a de-identified 
form)114 will be valuable for determining whether the terms of the guidelines 
themselves are appropriate or not. It will also permit scrutiny of how the 
guidelines are being applied in practice over a period of time. This sort of 
scrutiny ensures that decision making is of a high-quality and enables prob-
lems to be identified and addressed.115 It also can provide a measure of pub-
lic confidence in that the community knows how the guidelines are being 
used and what the outcomes are. This data can include decisions to prosecute 
as concerns about prejudicing the prosecution identified in relation to reasons 
for decisions need not arise at this systemic de-identified level of reporting, 
or if they do, the data can be included at a later stage once all proceedings 
have been concluded. 
The nature of the systemic data we consider should be captured includes:  
• demographic data for the deceased such as gender, age, ethnic 
background, health status, disabilities (if any), income level and 
educational level;  
• the deceased’s underlying illness (if any); 
                                                   
113 See the summary description of the various oversight mechanisms in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Oregon and Washington State in RSC Panel, 
supra note 4. The need for the collection and reporting of data was also recognized 
by the RSC Panel, ibid at 102. The collection and publication of data to improve 
the administration of criminal law processes has also been suggested in relation to 
‘death penalty’ cases in the United States. See James Liebman, “The 
Overproduction of Death” (2000) 100 Colum L Rev 2030. 
114 Although there will likely be few cases, other jurisdictions with smaller or similar 
populations to a number of Canadian provinces (e.g. Oregon is very close to or 
smaller than Québec, Ontario, BC, and Alberta) have been able to publish system-
ic data without revealing identifiable information. That said, reporting without 
risking identification may be difficult in the smaller jurisdictions. This point could 
support the pooling of information and reporting at a regional or national level 
(Canada’s population is substantially larger than Oregon and the Netherlands). 
115 See for example experiences with respect to “life ending acts without explicit 
request of the patient” and reporting rates in the Netherlands and Belgium as 
discussed in Rietjens et al, supra note 74 and Chambaere et al, supra note 79. 
2012 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN ASSISTED DYING IN 
CANADA: A PROPOSAL FOR CHARGING GUIDELINES 
159 
 
 
• whether the deceased had access to palliative care; 
• whether the deceased had private health insurance; 
• the relationship between the suspect and the deceased; 
• whether the case involved voluntary euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide; 
• the number of decisions reached to prosecute or not prosecute; 
and 
• the number of convictions that occurred in those cases where the 
decision was to prosecute. 
To achieve an understanding of the trends that might be emerging from the 
use of the guidelines, the data collected with respect to the first six elements 
in this list needs to be correlated with that collected with respect to the final 
two. 
Guidelines text 
Public Reporting of Decision Making 
Subject to any contrary legal obligation, the Attorney General will produce 
and publish reasons for a decision to not prosecute a case involving voluntary 
euthanasia and assisted suicide. Before concluding that the production and 
publication of reasons for a decision is not possible, consideration will be giv-
en to whether the reasons could be published in a more limited form. 
The Attorney General will publish in an Annual Report systemic data 
about what decisions are being made and how they are being made in accord-
ance with these guidelines. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to construct offence-specific guidelines 
for how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised in cases of voluntary eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide. The guidelines are meant to be consistent with 
the arguments made and conclusions drawn in the RSC Panel Report and to 
translate into practice the Panel’s recommendation with respect to prosecuto-
rial charging guidelines. In undertaking this task, we were guided by the 
well-established principles of respect for autonomy, the need for high-quality 
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prosecutorial decision making, and the importance of public confidence in 
that decision making. From these principles, we derived six components of a 
set of guidelines: an additional public interest factor (autonomy); elements of 
an autonomous choice; direct evidence of an autonomous choice; confidence 
whether death occurred as a result of autonomous choice; decision consented 
to by the Attorney General; and public reporting of decision making. It is our 
hope that the preceding discussion and proposed guidelines can make a use-
ful contribution to Canadian provinces and territories as they wrestle with the 
issue of how to respond to calls for the development of permissive regimes 
with respect to voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide through the adop-
tion of guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
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Appendix I: Proposed Prosecutorial Guidelines for Voluntary Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide (Consistent with RSC Panel Approach) 
Autonomous Choice: An Additional Public Interest Factor Specific to 
these Offences 
An additional public interest factor that tends against prosecution is that 
the deceased’s death occurred as a result of an autonomous choice made by 
the deceased for his or her life to end. 
An additional public interest factor that tends in favour of prosecution is 
that the deceased’s death did not occur as a result of an autonomous choice 
made by the deceased for his or her life to end. 
Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
The elements of an autonomous choice by the deceased for his or her life to 
end are: 
1. The deceased was capable of making the decision to end his or 
her life; 
2. The decision was made voluntarily by the deceased; and 
3. The deceased was offered sufficient information in relation to the 
decision to end his or her life.  
Direct Evidence in Relation to the Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
Factors that may be relevant to determining whether the deceased’s death 
occurred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her include: 
• Whether the deceased had been assessed recently as having ca-
pacity to make the decision to end his or her life by an appropri-
ately qualified medical or other health professional (capacity); 
• Whether the deceased needed assistance to make decisions about 
other aspects of his or her life (capacity); 
• Whether there was a clear and unequivocal request from the de-
ceased for voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide (voluntary); 
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• Whether the suggestion to consider voluntary euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide came from the deceased or from the suspect or 
others (voluntary); 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased’s decision was not brought about by pressure or coercion 
(voluntary); and 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased was offered sufficient and accurate information about the 
decision including, where appropriate, by qualified medical or 
other health professionals (information). 
Confidence Whether Death Occurred as a Result of Autonomous Choice 
The presence of factors that give confidence that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her does not reduce the 
scrutiny that the circumstances of the death receive. Such factors can, how-
ever, be used in weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether 
the elements of an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• The deceased’s decision for his or her life to end appeared to be 
a settled one; and 
• The suspect reported the death to the police or coroner within a 
reasonable time and co-operated fully with the investigation. 
The presence of factors that raise doubts that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her triggers additional 
scrutiny of the circumstances of the death. Such factors can also be used in 
weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether the elements of 
an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• There is a history of violence or abuse by the suspect towards the 
deceased; 
• There is an interest on the part of the suspect that conflicts with 
the interest of the deceased in making an autonomous choice 
about death. In determining the level of additional scrutiny and 
deliberation that is required, regard must be had to the likelihood 
of the conflict arising and whether the interest is such as to be a 
relevant factor in the suspect’s decision making; and 
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• The suspect did not report the death to the police or coroner 
within a reasonable time or did not co-operate fully with the in-
vestigation. 
Decision Consented to by the Attorney General 
All decisions whether or not to prosecute cases involving voluntary eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide pursuant to these guidelines must be consented 
to by the Attorney General. 
Public Reporting of Decision Making 
Subject to any contrary legal obligation, the Attorney General will pro-
duce and publish reasons for a decision to not prosecute a case involving 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Before concluding that the produc-
tion and publication of reasons for a decision is not possible, consideration 
will be given to whether the reasons could be published in a more limited 
form. 
The Attorney General will publish in an Annual Report systemic data 
about what decisions are being made and how they are being made in ac-
cordance with these guidelines. 
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Appendix II: Alternative Prosecutorial Guidelines for Voluntary 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Our Proposed Guidelines with the 
Addition of Protection of the Vulnerable Public Interest Factors 
Consistent with the Carter Approach) 
Autonomous Choice: An Additional Public Interest Factor Specific to 
These Offences 
An additional public interest factor that tends against prosecution is that 
the deceased’s death occurred as a result of an autonomous choice made by 
the deceased for his or her life to end. 
An additional public interest factor that tends in favour of prosecution is 
that the deceased’s death did not occur as a result of an autonomous choice 
made by the deceased for his or her life to end. 
Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
The elements of an autonomous choice by the deceased for his or her life 
to end are: 
1. The deceased was capable of making the decision to end his or 
her life; 
2. The decision was made voluntarily by the deceased; and 
3. The deceased was offered sufficient information in relation to the 
decision to end his or her life.  
Direct Evidence In Relation to the Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
Factors that may be relevant to determining whether the deceased’s death 
occurred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her include: 
• Whether the deceased had been assessed recently as having ca-
pacity to make the decision to end his or her life by an appropri-
ately qualified medical or other health professional (capacity); 
• Whether the deceased needed assistance to make decisions about 
other aspects of his or her life (capacity); 
• Whether there was a clear and unequivocal request from the de-
ceased for voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide (voluntary); 
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• Whether the suggestion to consider voluntary euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide came from the deceased or from the suspect or 
others (voluntary); 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased’s decision was not brought about by pressure or coercion 
(voluntary); and 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased was offered sufficient and accurate information about the 
decision including, where appropriate, by qualified medical or 
other health professionals (information). 
Confidence Whether Death Occurred as a Result of Autonomous Choice 
The presence of factors that give confidence that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her does not reduce the 
scrutiny that the circumstances of the death receive. Such factors can, how-
ever, be used in weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether 
the elements of an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• The deceased’s decision for his or her life to end appeared to be 
a settled one; and 
• The suspect reported the death to the police or coroner within a 
reasonable time and co-operated fully with the investigation. 
The presence of factors that raise doubts that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her triggers additional 
scrutiny of the circumstances of the death. Such factors can also be used in 
weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether the elements of 
an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• There is a history of violence or abuse by the suspect towards the 
deceased; 
• There is an interest on the part of the suspect that conflicts with 
the interest of the deceased in making an autonomous choice 
about death. In determining the level of additional scrutiny and 
deliberation that is required, regard must be had to the likelihood 
of the conflict arising and whether the interest is such as to be a 
relevant factor in the suspect’s decision making; and 
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• The suspect did not report the death to the police or coroner 
within a reasonable time or did not co-operate fully with the in-
vestigation. 
Protection of the Vulnerable: A Further Additional Public Interest Fac-
tor Specific to These Offences 
Factors that tend in favour of prosecution include: 
• the assistance was not provided by a medical practitioner in the 
context of a physician-patient relationship; and 
• the assistance was provided to the deceased who: 
o was not materially physically disabled or soon to be-
come so; 
o had not been diagnosed by a medical practitioner as hav-
ing a serious illness, disease or disability (including dis-
ability arising from traumatic injury);  
o was not in a state of advanced weakening capacities with 
no chance of improvement; 
o did not have an illness that was without remedy as de-
termined by reference to treatment options acceptable to 
him or her; or 
o did not have an illness causing enduring physical or psy-
chological suffering that was intolerable to him or her 
and could not be alleviated by any medical treatment ac-
ceptable to him or her. 
Decision Consented To by the Attorney General 
All decisions whether or not to prosecute cases involving voluntary eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide pursuant to these guidelines must be consented 
to by the Attorney General. 
Public Reporting of Decision Making 
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Subject to any contrary legal obligation, the Attorney General will pro-
duce and publish reasons for a decision to not prosecute a case involving 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Before concluding that the produc-
tion and publication of reasons for a decision is not possible, consideration 
will be given to whether the reasons could be published in a more limited 
form. 
The Attorney General will publish in an Annual Report systemic data 
about what decisions are being made and how they are being made in ac-
cordance with these guidelines. 
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Appendix III: Alternative Prosecutorial Guidelines for Voluntary Eutha-
nasia and Assisted Suicide (Our Proposed Guidelines with the Addition of 
Allowing for Advance Directives as Well as Protection of the Vulnerable 
Public Interest Factors Consistent With the Québec Committee Ap-
proach) 
Autonomous Choice: An Additional Public Interest Factor Specific to 
These Offences 
An additional public interest factor that tends against prosecution is that 
the deceased’s death occurred as a result of an autonomous choice made by 
the deceased for his or her life to end. 
An additional public interest factor that tends in favour of prosecution is 
that the deceased’s death did not occur as a result of an autonomous choice 
made by the deceased for his or her life to end. 
Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
The elements of an autonomous choice by the deceased for his or her life 
to end are: 
1. The deceased was capable of making the decision to end his or 
her life; 
2. The decision was made voluntarily by the deceased; and 
3. The deceased was offered sufficient information in relation to the 
decision to end his or her life.  
Direct Evidence In Relation to the Elements of an Autonomous Choice 
Factors that may be relevant to determining whether the deceased’s death 
occurred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her include: 
• Whether the deceased had been assessed recently as having ca-
pacity to make the decision to end his or her life by an appropri-
ately qualified medical or other health professional (capacity); 
• Whether the deceased needed assistance to make decisions about 
other aspects of his or her life (capacity); 
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• Whether there was a clear and unequivocal request from the de-
ceased for voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide (voluntary); 
• Whether the suggestion to consider voluntary euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide came from the deceased or from the suspect or 
others (voluntary); 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased’s decision was not brought about by pressure or coercion 
(voluntary); and 
• Whether the suspect or others took steps to ensure that the de-
ceased was offered sufficient and accurate information about the 
decision including, where appropriate, by qualified medical or 
other health professionals (information). 
Confidence Whether Death Occurred as a Result of Autonomous Choice 
The presence of factors that give confidence that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her does not reduce the 
scrutiny that the circumstances of the death receive. Such factors can, how-
ever, be used in weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether 
the elements of an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• The deceased’s decision for his or her life to end appeared to be 
a settled one; and 
• The suspect reported the death to the police or coroner within a 
reasonable time and co-operated fully with the investigation. 
The presence of factors that raise doubts that the deceased’s death oc-
curred as a result of an autonomous choice by him or her triggers additional 
scrutiny of the circumstances of the death. Such factors can also be used in 
weighing any direct evidence available in relation to whether the elements of 
an autonomous choice are satisfied. These factors include: 
• There is a history of violence or abuse by the suspect towards the 
deceased; 
• There is an interest on the part of the suspect that conflicts with 
the interest of the deceased in making an autonomous choice 
about death. In determining the level of additional scrutiny and 
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deliberation that is required, regard must be had to the likelihood 
of the conflict arising and whether the interest is such as to be a 
relevant factor in the suspect’s decision making; and 
• The suspect did not report the death to the police or coroner 
within a reasonable time or did not co-operate fully with the in-
vestigation. 
Advance Directives 
Despite the foregoing, the element of an autonomous choice is not vio-
lated in the context of an advance directive for medical aid in dying where: 
• the deceased was irreversibly unconscious, based on scientific 
knowledge; 
• the advance directive:  
o was given in a free and informed manner; 
o was legally binding; and 
o took the form of a notarized act or an instrument signed 
by two witnesses, including a commissioner of oaths; 
and 
• the assisting physician: 
o consulted another physician to confirm the irreversible 
nature of the unconsciousness; and 
o the physician consulted was independent of the deceased 
and the assisting physician. 
Protection of the Vulnerable: A Further Additional Public Interest Fac-
tor Specific to These Offences 
Factors that tend in favour of prosecution include: 
• the assistance was not provided by a medical practitioner; 
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• the medical practitioner providing assistance did not consult with 
another physician on whether the request met the protection of 
the vulnerable public interest factor; 
• the physician consulted was not independent of the deceased and 
the assisting physician; 
• the assisting physician did not complete a formal declaration of 
medical aid in dying; 
• the assistance was provided to an individual who: 
o was not a resident of Québec; 
o was not suffering from a serious, incurable disease; 
o was not in an advanced state of weakening capacities, 
with no chance of improvement; or 
o did not have constant and unbearable physical or psy-
chological suffering that could not be eased under condi-
tions he or she deemed tolerable; 
• the deceased’s request was not: 
o made in writing by way of a signed form; or 
o repeated within a reasonable period of time, depending 
on the type of disease. 
Decision Consented to by the Attorney General 
All decisions whether or not to prosecute cases involving voluntary eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide pursuant to these guidelines must be consented 
to by the Attorney General. 
Public Reporting of Decision Making 
Subject to any contrary legal obligation, the Attorney General will pro-
duce and publish reasons for a decision to not prosecute a case involving 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Before concluding that the produc-
tion and publication of reasons for a decision is not possible, consideration 
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will be given to whether the reasons could be published in a more limited 
form. 
The Attorney General will publish in an Annual Report systemic data 
about what decisions are being made and how they are being made in ac-
cordance with these guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
